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AN EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORM
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS
STEPHEN C. NEFF*
Tolerance is a very dull virtue. It is boring. Unlike love, it
has always had a bad press. It is negative. It merely means
putting up with people, being able to stand things. No one
has ever written an ode to tolerance, or raised a statue to her.
-E. M. Forster'
supremely unromantic
In a sense, Forster is correct; toleration is a.
virtue. Nowhere has it figured in crusades or revolutions; nor have
liberty, equality, and fraternity ever appeared willing to admit it to
their august company. Modest men, such as Sir Thomas More, 2 may
capture our imaginations on isolated occasions, but it is usually their
courage rather than their broadmindedness that gives lustre to their
heroism.
Perhaps we should not be surprised that the poets and demagogues have neglected to stress toleration as a virtue. However, the
fact that persons whose duty it is to build a just international legal order
have been similarly neglectful would seem to justify some expression
of dismay. This article will analyze the reasons for that neglect on the
part of the international order. The analysis will focus not only on the
historical reasons behind that failure, but also on the dilemmas that still
remain.
The most fundamental question to be answered before deciding
how to effectuate such a norm is to determine precisely what is meant
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by "religious tolerance" or "religious freedom". It is important to
recognize initially that two different types of religious discrimination
have existed in the past and that they have generated two very different
sets of problems. One problem arises when an individual's religious
convictions and his government make inconsistent demands upon him.
The other problem occurs when the state concedes that an individual's
religious convictions must prevail in certain areas of life, but then
proceeds to narrow those areas to an unacceptable degree.
There may appear to be little difference between these two situations from the standpoint of the individual. It is unlikely that he will
perceive any functional difference between being told that he may not
attend church because the State is atheistic and that he is not free to
believe otherwise; as opposed to being told that he is perfectly free to
be as devout as he wishes, but that state laws do not permit his church
to hold services or allow him a holiday on his day of worship.
It is clear, however, that two entirely different conflicts are
presented here. One conflict is between the State and the individual,
while the other is between the State and the Church. In the first case,
the individual's right to be loyal to his personal convictions is at stake;
in the second, the right of a nongovernmental institution to compete
with the State for the loyalty of its citizens is at stake. Lord Acton, in
contending that the second situation presents the more fundamental
dilemma, stated the matter in this way:
[R]eligious liberty is not the negative right of being without
any particular religion, just as self-government is not anarchy. It is the right of religious communities to the practice of
their own duties, the enjoyment of their own constitution,
and the protection of law, which equally secures to all the
3
possession of their own independence.
The key issue then, is whether "freedom of religion" means the
removal of restrictions on the right of the individual to worship or
believe as he wishes, or whether it means creating rules under which
Church and State are to function without conflict. It is the purpose of
this article to establish that even at this stage of development in
international human rights law, there has been no definitive resolution
of this basic question regarding freedom of religion.
3. J. Acton, The Protestant Theory of Persecution, in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND
88, 90 (3d ed. 1948). Lord Acton could speak from experience about religious
discrimination in that he had been able to attend neither Oxford nor Cambridge because
of his Roman Catholic religion. The Test and Corporations Acts, which excluded nonAnglicans from the two universities, were not repealed until 1871, even though Roman
Catholics had won the right to sit in Parliament in 1829. After their repeal, Acton became
Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge.
POWER
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The reason for the failure to resolve this basic question is historical in nature. In Western Europe the struggle over religious freedom
took a very different form than it did in the domains of the former
Ottoman Empire, 4 which included much of present-day Eastern
Europe and the Middle East. The first part of this article will analyze
how the two societies came to view the question of the role of religion
in society so differently; the second part will discuss the various means
which the international legal community has evolved to foster the goal
of religious freedom. The unique problems which arose from foisting
Western notions of religious toleration onto non-Western states also
will be discussed. The third section will review the early post-World
War II developments in the area of religious discrimination; and the
fourth part will analyze the United Nations' present attempt to take a
fresh, universalistic approach to this basic question.
4. One of the most striking aspects of Western European history is the fact that
the problem of religious persecution played such a large role there, while it played so
small a role in other cultures of the world such as the Middle East, India, and China. All
of those civilizations have known persecution, but none have experienced anything
remotely resembling the Inquisition or the Wars of Religion of the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries. The explanation of this phenomenon is outside the scope of this
article, however some points may be noted in passing. The most obvious characteristic
that distinguished the Christian-European civilization was the presence of a prestigious
and powerful priesthood. There is no question that India also had an immensely powerful
priestly class in its Brahmin caste, but an important difference existed between the two.
India's Brahmin caste was not corporately organized; a person became a Brahmin
automatically through the operation of being born to Brahmin parents. The individual
Brahmin, therefore, acknowledged no man as his superior. In contrast, the Roman
Catholic clergy of Europe were necessarily a nonhereditary class, since priests could not
marry; but more importantly, they were tightly organized into an authoritarian, wealthy,
ubiquitous, and disciplined hierarchy whose resources vastly exceeded those of any
secular state. 4 A. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 518 (1939 ed.).
The Islamic Middle East and Confucian China present contrasting and intriguing
pictures of theocracies which were religiously tolerant. They were theocracies in that
they made no distinction between civil and religious government. The officials of the
civil government tended to both secular and religious matters in the ordinary course of
their business. The toleration which characterized there two societies sprang from
different roots. In the case of Islam, the doctrines of the faith specifically enjoined
toleration of "the people of the book", who were Christians and Jews explicitly, and
Parsees (or Zoroastrians) by extension. W. WATT, THE MAJESTY THAT WAS ISLAM: THE

ISLAMIC WORLD 661-1100, at 46-49 (1974). On the other hand, the tolerance showed by
Confucianism resulted not so much from its humanity as from its exclusivity. It has been
argued endlessly whether Confucianism is a "religion". Without taking definite sides on
that issue, we may safely state that Confucianism was not a religion in the sense in which
the term is normally used today. The reason is that Confucianism did not welcome all
men into its fold and generally was the property of the aristodracy. In China, what the
West called Confucianism was known as "the way of the sages" or "the way of the
ancients", terms which are more accurate than the Western epithet "Confucian".
Confucianism was not a creed so much as it was the entire life-style of the Chinese
gentleman-landlord. This life-style necessarily included much leisure time, to be spent in
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THE BACKGROUND OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION:
WEST AND EAST

In Western Europe the struggle for religious freedom traditionally
has meant the struggle of the individual to worship as he pleases, and
not the struggle of the Church against the State. Any view of ChurchState relations in medieval Europe that makes a sharp distinction
between the two institutions is fundamentally defective. The function
of the secular monarchs and princes was not to govern their "states" in
anything like the modern sense. 5 There was no conflict of principle
between Church and State because there was no realistic distinction
between the "religious" and the "secular" spheres of life.
The distinctive feature of medieval thought is that contrasts
which later were to be presented as irreconcilable antithesis
appear in it as differences within a larger unity, and that the
world of social organization, originating in physical necessities, presses by insensible gradations into that of the spirit.
. . . Thus social institutions assume a character almost sacramental, for they are the outward and imperfect expression
6
of a supreme spiritual reality.
Consequently, the medieval "Church-State complex" was a totalitarian institution in the most literal sense.7 Like all totalitarian
the memorization of the classics and the study of the difficult Chinese writing system.
The fact that other faiths were tolerated in China is proof not of the tolerance of
Confucianism, but of its indifference to the spiritual well-being of the masses. See
Graham, Confucianism, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIVING FAITHS 365, 383-84
(R. Zaehner ed. 1959). Yet today most people would be more at home with the gentility
of the Confucian scholar than with the murderous sincerity of a medieval Christian
inquisitor.
5. 1 regret the long-established habit of speaking of medieval government as
a state when nothing justifies this sort of anachronism. For medieval thought,
there were princes, lords, rule, and government (principes, domini, dominium,
regimen). These were the subjects of political thought. . . . The difference is
. . . considerable. . . because in the concept of the modern state unrestricted
legislative power is central. Yet it was precisely such unrestricted legislative
power which medieval natural law denied to the prince. . . . [Cirucial was the
notion that all law was basically legal custom and that legislation had only the
function of clarifying and elucidating such customary law.
C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 43 (1958).
6. R. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 20-21 (1936 ed.). Only in
Renaissance Italy, and particularly in Florence, was it thought that a state could be
something man-made, individual, or independent of any religious sanction. Machiavelli
was a pioneer thinker in this regard. In The Prince he argued that morality and religion
should be divorced from statecraft. See J. BURCKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE
RENAISSANCE IN ITALY 101-05 (1929 ed.). The fact that Machiavelli is capable of shocking even modern readers is evidence that vestiges of the medieval notions of political
theory remain.
7. It should be pointed out that the Church was only totalitarian regarding matters
within Christian society. Jews were permitted to exist in Christendom, and even to retain
their status as Roman citizens, during the centuries of the so-called "Dark Ages". From
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systems, its unity was necessarily fragile for it was achieved at the
expense of individual liberty. Any dissenting movement became a
threat to the system, no matter how reasonable or limited its aims may
8
have been, because it undermined the major premise of universality.
To be sure, friction could and did arise between Church and State.
In fact, it was endemic from the Eleventh Century on. It should be
noted, however, that in none of the conflicts was the basic notion of a
partnership between Church and State disputed. The quarrels were
purely ones of interest and not of principle. What was really at stake
was which party, Church or State, would be the dominant one in the
partnership that both agreed should continue. 9 In most of these
medieval Church-State "conflicts", neither party had the slightest
notion of separating the Church and State or of allowing freedom of
worship to the individual Christian.
Even though the princes never challenged the church doctrine,
there were some bolder spirits who did. At the beginning of the
Eleventh Century, various heretical sects and societies sprang up over
Europe, and all of them were ruthlessly suppressed by the Church.
our vantage point, it appears somewhat bizarre that the Church was so ruthless about
extirpating heresy at the same time when it was so unconcerned about outright nonbelief.
We must remember that those were the days before the cult of nationalism had exalted
the territorial nation-state to its present-day status. The Christian commonwealth was
more a corporation than a state, and it was only within that context that it safely may be
said that the Church was totalitarian. On the juridical aspects of the relationship between
the Christian and non-Christian worlds of medieval Europe, see J. PARKES, THE JEW IN
THE MEDIEVAL COMMUNITY (1938); see also Blumenkranz, The Roman Church and the
Jews, in THE WORLD HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE: THE DARK AGES; JEWS IN
CHRISTIAN EUROPE 711-1096 (C. Roth ed. 1966).

8. Actually, the medieval Church had always been a curious blend of broad-mindedness and paranoia, of profound scholarship and base superstition, and of reaction and
progressivism. It was indeed very Catholic. The study of medieval heresies has been an
area of contention in modern times, but in general it may be said that in the Church's
decision of whether to embrace or suppress a given intellectual movement was based on
neither its orthodoxy per se nor the life-style of its adherents. After all, the mendicant
orders of Saints Francis and Dominic were taken into the Church in the Thirteenth
Century, while the Lollards of Wycliffe were attacked in the Fourteenth Century. The
distinction is that the former accepted the authority of the church hierarchy, while the
latter did not. On the medieval heresies, see A. TURBERVILLE, MEDIEVAL HERESY AND
THE INQUISITION (1964); J. RUSSELL, DISSENT AND REFORM IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES

(1965); HERESIES ET SOCIETES DANS L'EUROPE PRE-INDUSTRIELLE,

I IE-18E SIiCLES (J.

Le Goff ed. 1968); 2 G. LEFF, HERESY IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES: THE RELATION OF
HETERODOXY TO DISSENT, C. 1250-c. 1450 (1967); W. BAUER, ORTHODOXY AND HERESY IN
EARLIEST CHRISTIANITY (R. Kraft & G. Drodel eds. 1971); SCHISM, HERESY, AND RELIGIOUS PROTEST; PAPERS READ AT THE TENTH SUMMER MEETING

AND THE ELEVENTH

WINTER MEETING OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY SOCIETY (D. Baker ed. 1972); and
LAMBERT, MEDIEVAL HERESY: POPULAR MOVEMENTS FROM BOGOMIL TO HUS (1976).

M.

9. 2 H. PIRENNE, A HISTORY OF EUROPE 3-4 (1956).
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The princes were nearly always aligned with the Church in its
campaign against the heretics, 0 because many of the heresies involved
demands for economic and social change which threatened the medieval order." Even with the onset of the Reformation in the early Sixteenth Century, when many German princes embraced the new creed
of Lutheranism, they did not commit themselves to the notion that
individuals should have the right to choose their own faith. Their own
conversions to the new faith had little to do with a sincere religious
belief:
We do not find in any one of [the princes who embraced
Lutheranism] the least trace of idealism, the slightest evidence of any sincere and disinterested conviction. Doubtless
they were dissatisfied with the Church, but doubtless
also they would not have broken with it if this rupture had
not afforded them the opportunity of secularizing its property and confiscating its revenues; and by proclaiming themselves, in their own principalities, the heads of their territorial Churches, they acquired a two-fold authority and influence over their subjects. Such were the wholly mundane
considerations which determined the conduct of these
defenders of the new faith. Of all religious confessions,
Lutheranism is the only one which, instead of exhorting its
protectors to sacrifice their life and their fortune to it, offered itself to them as a profitable business transaction. 2
It is apparent that even the early Protestant leaders lacked an
adequate conception of religious freedom. They were much more
10. The most extraordinary example of this fact is found in the carrer of Frederick
II of the Holy Roman Empire (1194-1250), whose intellect and sophistication earned him
the nickname of Stupor Mundi, which means Wonder of the World, from his contemporaries. He was at least a free-thinker, possibly an atheist, and certainly a deadly enemy
of the Papacy. Yet, he engaged in savage persecution of heretics within his kingdom in
southern Italy. Id. at 25. The same phenomenon was evident in the career of Henry VIII
of England, whose defiance of the Church included substituting himself for the Pope as
its head in England under the Act of Supremacy 1534. To the end of his reign, Henry
ecumenically put to death both Catholics for treason and Protestants for heresy. H.
FISHER, A HISTORY OF EUROPE 523-24 (1935). For a discussion of the juridical position of
the present-day Church of England, see Paul, Legal Straitjacket of the Church of
England, 220 CONTEMP.REV. 242 (1972).
I1. See Evans, Social Aspects of Medieval Heresy, in PERSECUTION AND LIBERTY:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GEORGE LINCOLN BURR 93 (1931). See also note 8 supra.
12. H. PIRENNE, supra note 9, at 287. It may seem curious that Luther, the most
famous of all religious rebels, should prove to have been extremely conservative in
social and economic matters. He believed in the absolutism of secular authorities and
was horrified to find that the German peasants of the 1520s were demanding the end of
serfdom. He believed that the message of the Christian faith was degraded if it was put to
work for such mundane ends as political and social equality. R. TAWNEY, supra note 6,
at 93.
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interested in finding new sources of revenue through the confiscation
and sale of church property, thereby avoiding the inconvenience and
embarassment associated with imposing taxes upon an armed and often
resentful peasant population.' 3 Even the later, more radical Protestant
movements had little interest in tolerating rival faiths. Calvinist Geneva, Anabaptist Munster, and Puritan Massachusetts Bay Colony were
all fiercely intolerant of those who believed other than the official
line. 14
The significance of the Reformation did not lie in either the
achievement of the separation of Church and State, or in the advancement of the ideal of freedom of individual worship. Rather, it lay in the
fact that it finally shattered the dream that all of Western Europe had to
be of one faith. Once it was conceded that different states could have
different official religions, which is a principle that found juridical
expression in the Peace of Augsburg of 1555,15 then thoughtful men
could begin to surmise that if Christendom could survive without the
vital principle of religious unity, perhaps individual states could do so
as well.
13. The earliest example of a monarch in need of cash helping himself to the wealth
of the Church was Philip IV of France, who dissolved the crusading order of the Knights
Templars. The Templars had gone into the banking business and had become a substantial financial power and, thereby, a tempting target. 2 H. PIRENNE, supra note 9, at 13940. A later, and more famous example was Henry Vll's dissolution of the English
monasteries, for basically the same reasons, in the 1530s. One generally unknown aspect
of this story is that Henry paid compensation to the individual monks whose establishments were dissolved in the form of state pensions. G. TREVELYAN, ENGLISH SOCIAL
HISTORY: A SURVEY OF SIX CENTURIES CHAUCER To QUEEN VICTORIA 106-08 (3d ed.
1946).
The phenomenon of monastic establishments accumulating great wealth was by no
means confined to Western history. Buddhist monasteries in China were also notorious
for their holdings of precious metal, often in the form of Buddha images. It would appear
that the greed of secular princes for the treasure of churches was an ecumenical
phenomenon, for in China during the 840s, as in Europe later on, the monasteries were
secularized and all statues were ordered delivered to the government for melting down.
W. EBERHARD, A HISTORY OF CHINA 179-81, 187-88 (3d ed. 1969). Similar instances
abound in history, to the point that confiscations of church property virtually became de
rigueur for modernizing states. On the seizures of church properties which occured in
the various states of Latin America, see generally J. RIPPY, LATIN AMERICA: A MODERN
HISTORY (1958).
14. For an exposition of the theory that Protestantism tends to be more intolerant
than Catholicism, in that the former tends to persecute error per se, while the latter
attacks only those who deviate within the faith, see ACTON, supra note 3; see also note 7
supra.
15. The Peace of Augsburg ended the first round of the religious wars of the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. It was based on the formula cujus regio ejus
religio, which means that each prince was to decide what religion would prevail in his
domain. However, the subjects of the princes were to have no choice in the matter, so
that the Church-State bond would remain intact, as it had in England thirty years earlier.
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Yet it required another century of carnage and persecution,
climaxing in the ferocious Thirty Years' War,' 6 before reigning
monarchs could accept that idea. Only with the Peace of Wesphalia of
1648 did individuals achieve a recognized right in international law to
worship differently from their rulers.' 7 Even then the principle was not
wholly free from doubt:
Subjects who in 1627 had been debarred from the free exercise of a religion other than that of their ruler were by the
Peace granted the right of conducting private worship, and of
educating their children at home or abroad, in conformity
with their own faith; they were not to suffer in any civil
capacity nor to be denied religious burial, but were to be at
liberty to emigrate, selling their estates or leaving them to be
managed by others. Some ambiguity, however, attaches to
the stipulations of the Peace on this head. One passage
provides for the patient toleration of subjects not of the
rulers' religion; but another seems to imply that, exceptions
apart, the ruler may oblige such subjects to emigrate, though
without forcibly abducting them or fixing their destination. 8
The important point concerning the concept of religious toleration
as it arose in the mid-Seventeenth Century was that it was based solely
on expediency and not on principle. Religious uniformity had been
found to be costly and unfeasible, rather than wrong or illegal. "Toleration was regarded not as a grand principle but as a necessary com19
promise with error."
The Peace of Augsburg cannot be reckoned among the great liberating documents of history. . . . But as a rough, serviceable solution of a grave controversy, it deserves to be honorably thought of, for, if it did not bring
religious harmony, it kept war out of Germany for fifty years.
H. FISHER, supra note 10, at 557.
16. The destruction wrought by the Thirty Years' War has become legendary,
partia!ly because it has been somewhat exaggerated. See Coleman, Economic Problems
and Policies, in 5 THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY: THE ASCENDANCY OF FRANCE
1648-88, at 19, 21 (F. Carsten ed. 1961).
17. Such a right had been granted previously in French domestic law with the
promulgation of the Edict of Nantes of 1598 allowing Protestants (Huguenots) the right
to worship freely. The king who permitted this right, Henry IV, was a former Huguenot.
The Edict was revoked by Louis XIV in 1685, and toleration was not restored until 1763.
18. Ward, The Peace of Westphalia, in 4 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY: THE
THIRTY YEARS' WAR 395, 412 (A. Ward, G. Prothero & S. Leathers eds. 1934). See also
Gross, Peace of Westphalia, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1948).
19. G. TREVELYAN, A SHORTENED HISTORY OF ENGLAND 351 (1942). In essence,
this was the argument that Locke presented in his Letter Concerning Toleration:
Civil power, right, and dominion. . . neither can nor ought in any manner to
be extended to the salvation of souls, or can any such power be vested in the
magistrate by the consent of the people . . . for no man can, if he would,
conform his faith to the dictates of another. All the life and power of true
religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind. . ..
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Holland and Prussia are two states which illustrate this last point
because they carried the realpolitik of toleration to its furthest extent.
Holland had an established faith in Calvinism, as enunciated in the
Synod of Dort of 1619, but the economic interests of the Dutch
Regent classes proved stronger than the dogmas of Calvin. One
observer summed up the Dutch system best by noting that the Regents
countenance only Calvinism, but for Trade's sake they Tolerate all others except Papists: which is the reason why the
treasure and stock of most Nations is transported thither,
where there is full Liberty of Conscience: you may be what
the Devil you will there, so you be but peaceable. 0
Later in the Seventeenth Century, Frederick the Great of Prussia
proved that the granting of religious toleration could be just as profitable as the plundering of monasteries. Seeking to bolster the population of his little kingdom and to make its wastelands productive,
Frederick actively encouraged the immigration of foreigners by offering them freedom of worship as an inducement. 21 The monarch himself succinctly summed up his attitude on the subject by stating that
"[i]f Turks and heathern [sic] came and wanted to populate the
country, we would build them mosques and churches.'"22
Two important points should be garnered from this historical
discussion. First, the basic issue was the right of the individual to
believe and worship as he chooses. Second, religious toleration as it
evolved in Western Europe was a practice and not a juridical principle;
a modus vivendi and not a recognition of a fundamental human right.
The situation in the non-Western European states, however, was significantly different.
It is instructive to compare the Western approach to the problem
of religious freedom with that of the Ottoman Empire, which was, in
spite of its greater political unity, much more religiously heterogeneous than its western neighbor. The contrast between the religious
The weakness of this approach under circumstances prevailing in today's world is
apparent. The Lockean argument is based upon the factual premise that an individual's
faith is not susceptible to being changed by government fiat, which is an assumption that
is currently open to question. See note 160 infra. That the "necessary compromise with
error" was officially thought to be only temporary is evident from the inclusion within
the Peace Treaties of Westphalia of the proviso that the agreement would be valid
semper et ubique (until the day of religious reunion). This proviso was also present in the
Peace of Augsburg of the previous century. Ward, supra note 18.
20. J. MURRAY, AMSTERDAM IN THE AGE OF REMBRANDT 25 (1967).
21. E. WILLIAMS, THE ANCIENT REGIME IN EUROPE: GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN
THE MAJOR STATES 1648-1789, at 385 (1970).

22. Id. at 385-86.
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policies of the two could hardly be more striking. In fact, it would even
be inaccurate to think of the Ottoman polity as being a state at all, for it
was more nearly a confederation of autonomous religious communities, or millets. 23
The essence of the millet system of government was that it not
only tolerated numerous religions, but also shared political power with
them. Governmental functions were carefully parceled out and shared
between the various religious communities and the Ottoman central
government. The latter retained for itself a monopoly on the four most
vital governmental functions: police, criminal justice, defense, and

finance. 24
In all other aspects, the subject peoples were left to govern
themselves, not through territorial units such as cities or provinces as is
true in federal states today, but rather through the various confessional,
communities. 25 The Patriarch of Constantinople was given the responsibility of governing all orthodox Christians wherever situated and
whether they owed their ecclesiastical loyalty to him or to one of the
three other patriarchs. 26 All unorthodox Christians were governed
initially by a bishop of the Armenian Church. Later, however, the
various individual unorthodox Christian factions, such as the Monophysites, Nestorians, Maronites, and eventually even the Protestants,
became self-governing. The Muslim community was under the aegis
of the grand mufti of Istanbul, and Jewish communities had their
various millets .27
We may now begin to see how different the Ottoman world was
from the Western world. In Europe, where Church and State were
closely bound, the Church was assumed to be all-powerful; and the
fundamental problem was the emancipation of the individual. The
situation in the Ottoman Empire was the reverse; the freedom of the
individual to be of a different faith from his ruler was taken for
granted. The essential problem was how much authority was to be
given to the various churches, and how much should be reserved for
the central government.
23. The word millet is from the Arabic milla, meaning community of worshippers.
24. 8 A. TOYNBEE, supra note 4, at 184.
25. Lebanon has occasionally been labeled a "confessional democracy". However, the Lebanese confessions are not self-governing, as was the case in the Ottoman
system. They are merely the basis for the sharing of the central governmental power. See
Suleiman, Elections in a Confessional Democracy, 29 J. POL. 109 (1967).
26. See Ainakis, Greek Church of Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire, 24 J.
MOD. HIST. 235 (1952).
27. 8 A. TOYNBEE, supra note 4, at 184-86.
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As long as the Ottomans were content to make only modest
claims to power, there was little conflict over the division of authority
between Church and State. However, with the onset of Western-style
nationalism in the Nineteenth Century, and particularly with the advent
of the totalitarian government in the Twentieth Century, such moderation diminished. How the international community reacted to that
crisis will be discussed in the next section.
II.

THE PROMOTION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY BY THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM BEFORE WORLD WAR

II

The international legal order has evolved three different methods
of ensuring religious freedom. However, none of the methods contain
a universally applicable norm of religious toleration, and it is questionable whether the fostering of religious freedom was anything but a
subsidiary goal. These three methods, the bilateral treaty method, the
humanitarian intervention method, and the conditional benefit method
shall be dealt with in order.
A.

The Treaty Method

The first strategy, the treaty method, was oriented primarily
toward protecting Christian merchants and pilgrims from the Turkish
infidels who ruled the Holy Land. The idea of binding one prince to
observe the religious rights of the subjects of another prince by treaty is
a venerable one. As early as the Seventh Century, Arab Caliph Omar
had entered into such a treaty with the Byzantine Emperor. Omar
promised to allow freedom of worship to those Christians in his
domains who would pay a poll tax for the privilege. 28 The Emperor of
Constantinople entered into a similar agreement in 944 with the Russian Prince Igor, who extended to the Emperor a right of protectorship
vis 6 vis the officers of the Orthodox Church who resided in Russian
territory .29

This system of achieving religious freedom through protection
from an extraterritorial power became an established institution of the
Middle East, particularly after the influx of Western Italian merchant
28. N. BENTWICH, THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONALISM; A STUDY

IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THROUGH THE AGES 208 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as
BENTWICH]. If the Emperor made any concession in return for this promise by Omar,
then the treaty represented a diplomatic victory for the latter, because he promised
nothing more than what his Islamic faith required him to do in any event. On the official
toleration required by Islam toward the "people of the book", see W. WArr, supra note
4. See also Ishaque, Human Rights in Islamic Law, 12 REV. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 30
(1974); and M. KHAN, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1967).
29. BENTWICH, supra note 28, at 209.
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communities in the post-Crusade era. 30 The treaty of 1536 between
Francis I of France and Suleiman the Magnificent of the Ottoman
Empire, in which Francis I was given the right of protection for
Christians residing in Ottoman domains, was the seminal event that led
to the institution of protection from an extraterritorial power. 3 This
treaty authorized French kings to protect all Christians. The English,
however, proceeded to negotiate their own "capitulation", as this
right had come to be known in 1583.32
In the course of the decay of Ottoman political power, a number
of variations on this protection theme were played. The Treaty of
Carlowitz (1699) gave the ambassador from Poland the right to bring
demands on the subject of religion to the Sultan's attention. 33 A similar
right was awarded to Russia in 1774 by the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji,
along with an obligation on the Sultan's part to protect the Orthodox
religion and its churches. 34 Meanwhile, in 1740, the French capitulations has been confirmed and made permanent. 35 It may be recalled
that the nominal issue in the Crimean War of the mid-Nineteenth
30. I H. PIRENNE, supra note 9, at 179-80 contends that the only accomplishment of
the Crusades was the resulting Italian commercial penetration of the Islamic world. Most
historians, however, credit them with more substantive results than that.
31. BENTW[CH, supra note 28, at 219.
32. Actually, there were two aspects to this capitulation system: first, the right of
diplomatic protection, which was granted to the king of the merchants' home state; and
second, the granting of juridical privileges to the merchants themselves. The former was
generally a bilateral arrangement, while the latter often took the form of a unilateral
grant of privileges to the merchants, such as exemption from the territorial laws of the
host state. The charters granting these latter rights were divided into chapters, or
capitula in Latin, hence the name capitulations. Therefore, the term capitulation properly applies only to this second type of grant.
Some uncertainty has always existed as to the precise nature of these capitulations,
for if they were purely acts of grace, as they purported to be on their face, then they
were freely revocable. On the other hand, if they were granted pursuant to a treaty with
another monarch, with the merchants becoming third-party beneficiaries of that treaty,
then they could not be revoked unilaterally. For the manner in which this problem was
"solved", see the text at note 39 infra. See also 2 J. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: INTERNATIONAL PERSONS 484-88 (1969); N. SOUSA, THE
CAPITULATORY REGIME OF TURKEY: ITS HISTORY ORIGIN, AND NATURE (1933); Y. ALTUG, TURKEY AND SOME PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-40 (1958); and R. BULLARD, LARGE AND LOVING PRIVILEGES; THE CAPITULATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA (1960).

33. BENTWICH, supra note 28, at 220.
34. Id. There is some dispute as to whether this treaty went so far as to confer upon
Russia the right to resort to military means to rectify a situation if its diplomatic
entreaties proved to be of no avail. M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 23-24 (1962), where this question is answered in the affirmative. Fonteyne, The

Customary InternationalLaw Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention:Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter, 4 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 207-08 (1974) disagrees.
35. Id.at 219.
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Century was the legitimacy of Russia's claim to the same protectorship
powers vis-d-vis orthodox Christians in Turkish domains that the
French had won on behalf of Roman Catholic Christians. 36
The treaty method of advancing religious freedom was established outside of the Middle East as well. An agreement in 1572
between England and France guaranteed the personal safety and the
protection of property for English Protestants in France. 37 Note that the
United States has made ample use of the treaty device, with provisions
for religious liberty contained in treaties of amity, commerce, and
navigation with the Netherlands, Sweden, Prussia, China, Japan,
Siam, the Congo, Germany, Ecuador, Honduras, Austria, Norway,
38
Poland, Finland, Liberia, and Iraq.
Nevertheless, the treaty system had some drawbacks. One of the
chief problems in the context of the Ottoman Empire was the fact that
the privileged position enjoyed by foreign merchants by virtue of the
capitulations eventually came to be resented by the Turkish government and its subjects. By 1914, the Ottoman government purported to
abolish the capitulations unilaterally; but the Western powers protested, claiming that the act was a violation of Turkey's international
obligations. 39 The issue remained open until 1923, when Convention
IV Additional to the Treaty of Lausanne provided for the abolition of
the capitulations with the Western states' consent. 4°
B.

The HumanitarianIntervention Method

The second international legal mechanism which evolved at least
in part for the protection of religious freedom was the method of
36. The early -capitulations, including the permanent one of 1740, involved only the
privileges of persons, and not cessions of territory. By the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji,
Russia had been granted substantially the same rights in this regard as France. With a
new treaty in 1853, however, the French surged ahead in the carving up of the Ottoman
polity. After two years of diplomatic pressure and threats of naval action by the French,
Turkey agreed to allow Roman Catholic Christians a share in the actual administration of.
Christian holy sites. In theory, however, even that agreement did not allow for exclusive
possession by the Christians. After the Latin Christians were allowed de facto full
control of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, the Russian government began
contending, not unreasonably, that Orthodox Christians should have the benefit of a
similar concession. Russia's show of force in support of this demand sparked the
Crimean War. D. THOMSON, EUROPE SINCE NAPOLEON 243-46 (1966).
37. BENTWICH, supra note 28, at 218. French Huguenots did not receive a similar
gift from their own government until twenty-six years later. See note 17 supra. The very
year of the English treaty witnessed the appalling St. Bartholemew's Day Massacre of
Huguenots in Paris.
38.

M. BATES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN INQUIRY 479, 485-86 (1945). See also Note,

Toward International Freedom of Religion: A Proposalfor Change in FCN Treaty
Practice, 7 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 553 (1974).
39. See note 32 supra.
40.

VERZIJL, supra note 32.
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humanitarian intervention. This method was like the treaty method in
that it found its primary application in relations between the Western
European states and the Ottoman Empire. There is some doubt,however, whether the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was ever a part of
customary international law. 4 Moreover, substantial doubt is justified
as to whether many of the incidents that are suggested as examples of
the practice of humanitarian intervention do, in fact, merit the use of
the term. 42 Examples commonly given include the use of armed force
for the protection of Christians in Ottoman domains, such as interventions by Western powers in Greece (1832); Lebanon (1860); Crete
(1866-67); Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria (1875-77); Armenia
(1895-96); and Macedonia (1905).43
The complex question of whether a doctrine of humanitarian
intervention truly existed under customary international law and
whether it exists today under the United Nations Charter will not be
addressed in this article. Nor will the problem of whether any of the
above interventions were truly "humanitarian" be examined. 44 Suffice
it to say that the above questions are eventually answered, the doctrine
was not and is not sufficiently defined or institutionalized to be utilized
with any consistency in the present or predictability in the future. 45 An
adequate international legal mechanism for the protection of religious
freedom must be sought elsewhere.
41. See Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 217 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
42. See Franck & Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of HumanitarianIntervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275 (1973).
43. Feinberg, International Protection of Human Rights and the Jewish Question, 3
ISRAEL L. REV. 487, 489 (1968).

44.

For analyses from various points of view on these issues, see Rougier, La

Thiorie de l'Intervention d'Humaniti, 17 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

468 (1910); Wright, The Legality of Intervention under the United Nations
Charter, 51 ASIL PROcs. 79 (1957); Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15
MCGILL L. J. 225 (1969); Claydon, HumanitarianIntervention and InternationalLaw, I
QUEEN'S INTRAMURAL L. J. 36 (1969); de Shutter, HumanitarianIntervention:A United
Nations Task, 3 CALIF. W. INT'L L. J. 21 (1972); Chilstrom, HumanitarianIntervention
under Contemporary International Law: A Policy-Oriented Approach, I YALE STUD.
PUBLIQUE

WORLD PUB. ORDER 93 (1974); Fonteyne, supra note 34; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

AND THE UNITED NATIONS (R. Lillich ed. 1973); and Lillich, HumanitarianIntervention:
A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL
WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229 (J. Moore ed. 1974).

45. The International Law Association's Subcommittee on the International Protection of Human Rights by General International Law considered writing a draft
Protocol of Procedure for Humanitarian Intervention. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE 641 (1970). However, in 1976 it
concluded that the necessary consensus on the subject within the international legal
community could not be obtained. Report of the Subcommittee on the International
Protection of Human Rights by General International Law 3 (1976).
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The "Conditional Benefit" Method

The third strategy for the protection of religious freedom also
proved to be controversial. This method was actually a new, multilateral twist to the old treaty strategy. In the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries, the practice arose of viewing the recognition of religious
freedom as a condition for a state's receipt of some tangible benefit,
such as a territorial concession. An early example is the Treaty of Paris
of 1763, whereby England was awarded the French possessions in
Canada, but with the proviso that it allow its new Roman Catholic
46
subjects to worship freely.
The Congress of Vienna (1814-15), which pieced together the
map of Europe after the disruptions of Napoleon, faced the problem of
freedom of religion in three different contexts. First, Holland committed itself by treaty 47 to allow freedom of worship within its territory.4 8
The reason was obvious; Holland had been awarded the predominantly
Roman Catholic Spanish Netherlands (present-day Belgium) as part of
the settlement. Thus, the grant of freedom of religion to the Catholic
community was simply the quid pro quo. 4 Another "winner" at the
conference was the Protestant Swiss Canton of Geneva, which received a portion of the Catholic duchy of Savoy in return for allowing
the inhabitants freedom of worship.5 0 The third aspect of religious
freedom that received attention at Vienna was the treatment of Jews in
the Rhineland. The Final Act of the Congress recommended to the
newly constituted German Confederated States that they grant full civil
51
liberty to the Jews in their territory.
Another area which proved fruitful for the use of this new type of
treaty commitment was the admission of new states to the exclusive
club of territorially and linguistically compact nation-states. The most
significant event in this respect was the admission of Turkey to the
"Public Law and System (Concert) of Europe" in 1856.52 One condi46. BENTWICH, supra note 28, at 213-14.
47. See the text at note 20 supra.
48. Feinberg, supra note 43, at 490.
49. The union between the two was short lived. The Belgians revolted in 1830, only
to be invaded and defeated by the Dutch the following year. At this point the French
intervened and forced the Dutch to withdraw. The Treaty of the Twenty-Four Articles,
adopted by a conference of powers which met in London in 1831, provided for the
independence of Belgium, although the Dutch did not subscribe to the agreement until
1838. THOMSON, supra note 36, at 168-70.
50. BENTWICH, supra note 28 at 218.
51. Feinberg, supra note 43, at 489-90. The recommendation went unheeded.
52. THOMSON, supra note 36, at 248. The Concert of Europe might be identified as
the executive committee of the club of nation-states. Originally it consisted of five
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tion for this admission was the promulgation by the Ottoman government of the Hatt-i Hamayoun, which took control of the millets out of
ecclesiastical hands and imposed a single, empire-wide Turkish citizenship upon all persons in the empire. Equality before the law and
equal access to public office were guaranteed.5 3
The policy of conditionally admitting new states to the community of nations upon their granting "equality before the law" to their
subjects continued long after 1856. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878,
the creation of four new states, Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, was made conditional upon the same guarantees. 54 It was at
this conference that Bismarck, then chancellor of Germany, explicitly
posited a link between the recognition of a state's independence and its
55
guarantee of religious freedom to its citizenry.
The problem in this arrangement was that the sovereignty that was
being granted was deemed by the recipients as being more important
than the conditions attached to it. Furthermore, since the notion of
religious freedom evoked vivid memories of the churches wielding
substantial political and judicial power, any promise of "religious
freedom" was seen as an especially dangerous threat to state
sovereignty. To the extent that an inconsistency between the two
notions of religious freedom and state sovereignty existed, the former
tended to be curtailed.
There is no evidence that Western statesmen were particularly
sensitive to the dilemma of the new states, which were left on their
own to try to reconcile Western Statecraft with Eastern Churchcraft.
This difficult problem was compounded by the fact that the phenomenon of nationalism was taking root in a part of the world where
compact territorial states could not be created without including substantial minorities within them. "Within the Ottoman frontiers..
states, whose chief function was to guarantee the viability of the 1815 Vienna settlement.
Those states were the United Kingdom, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and again-monarchical
France. The five met regularly until the Congress of Verona of 1822, after which they
gathered only in ad hoc international conferences. As a tribute to the harmony in which
they usually worked, it can be said that all five of the major territorial settlements of
Europe between 1815 and 1860 were ratified by the Concert. Those settlements were the
independence of Greece in 1832, the independence of Belgium in 1839, the Straits
Question of 1840-41, the Schleswig-Holstein controversy of 1852, and the resolution of
the Crimean War in 1856. Only on the first of these occasions were any of the five
absent. In that case, Prussia and Austria did not participate. Id. at 244-45.
53. Id. at 341-42. See also R. DAVISON, REFORM IN THE OTrOMAN EMPIRE 18561876, at 52-80 (1963); and N. BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY II12 (1964).
54. McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Right to Religious Freedom and World Public
Order: The Emerging Norm of Non-Discrimination, 74 MICH. L. REV. 865,879-80 (1976).
55. Feinberg, supra note 43, at 496.
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there were few districts whose population was even approximately
homogeneous in linguistic nationality, and few which possessed even
56
the rudiments of local statehood."
Perhaps all of these problems would have been soluable were it
not for the fact that these guarantees of Western-style civil liberties
represented humiliations as well as impossibilities for the new states.
By being compelled to subscribe to a general norm of religious toleration which the great powers had never recognized as applying to
themselves, they were, in effect, being admitted to the international
community as second-class citizens. In the United Kingdom, for example, the various religious disabilities of non-Anglicans disappeared
only piecemeal during the course of the Nineteenth Century, and the
disappearance was not pursuant to any generally acknowledged norm
of religious freedom. 57 The situation was similar in France, where
official separation of Church and State came only in 1905.58 The
Constitution of Norway forbade the settlement of Jesuits in the country
until 1956, 59 and Switzerland did not emancipate its Jews until 1872. 60
Even today, the Federal Republic of Germany acts as the collection
agent for the kirchensteuer, or church tax, which supplies about ninety
percent of the revenue from both the Protestant and the Catholic
61
churches of Germany.
56. 8 A. TOYNBEE, supra note 4, at 189.
57. Official freedom of worship was allowed in England by the Act of Toleration
1688, but various civil disabilities still continued to burden all non-Anglicans. The
disabilities of Protestant dissenters, excepting Quakers, were finally removed in 1828.
Disabilities of Roman Catholics were removed in 1829. Jews were "emancipated" in
1858, Quakers in 1868, and nonbelievers in 1888. Civil marriage was nonexistant in
English law until 1836. The first nonconformist to sit in a cabinet was John Bright, who
headed Gladstone's Board of Trade in 1868. Oxford and Cambridge Universities were
finally opened to non-Anglicans in 1871. Even today, neither the monarch nor the Lord
Chancellor can be a Roman Catholic.
58. 3 A. COBBAN, A HISTORY OF MODERN FRANCE 63-65 (1965).

59. Scheuner, Comparison of the Jurisprudence of National Courts With That of
the Organs of the Convention as Regards Other Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 214, 233 (A. Robertson ed. 1968). This Norwegian case differs
from the others in that the emancipation, when it finally did occur, was undertaken
pursuant to the international legal standard of the European Convention for the Preservation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See also Modinos, Effects and
Repurcussions of the European Convention on Human Rights, I IINT'L. & COMP. L.Q.
1097, 1102 (1962).
60. BENTWICH, supra note 28, at 222.
61. The kirchensteuer is a surtax on income which ranges from eight percent to ten
percent, according to lander. It has existed in practice since at least the Nineteenth
Century, although it only received constitutional sanction in 1919 with the establishment
of the Weimar Republic. Later it was embodied in a 1933 concordat with the Papacy. The
tax is voluntary in that only those taxpayers who register themselves as either Protes-
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In light of all these practices, it is not surprising that the new
states paid scant attention to their treaty obligations. Violations were
common, particularly so in the case of Rumania, whose treatment of
its Jewish citizens became one of the scandals of Europe. 62 Wherever
nationalism took hold, it arrived hand in hand with a ferocious and new
intolerance of differing ways. In 1881 the era of systematic programs
against Russian Jews began. 63 In the 1890s the replacement of the
traditionally tolerant Islamic religion with the jealous cult of national64
ism in the Ottoman Empire resulted in the Armenian massacres.
Clearly, modernization was carrying with it some unintended consequences. The notion of religious freedom was, in fact, only a minor
element of a "Westernization package" whose dominant element was
a nationalism which tended to exacerbate hatred against minority
groups, rather than alleviate it.
Nevertheless, the Powers continued to demonstrate their concern
for providing international legal guarantees of religious freedom in
faraway parts of the globe. The Constitution of the Congo Free State,
drawn up by the Conference of Berlin in 1885, provided for religious
tants or Catholics are asked to pay it. Curiously, many more persons appear to pay the
tax then actually attend church regularly. C. PALLENBERG, VATICAN FINANCES 171-79

(1971). When the government of the Federal Republic of Germany introduced a mandatory civil surtax of ten percent on incomes in 1970, the result was a spate of deregistrations from the kirchensteuer lists. Apparently this was an effort by people to prevent
their real incomes from falling. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1970, at 12, col. 8.
62. 2 N. SOKOLOW, HISTORY OF ZIONISM 1600-1918, at 137-38 (1969). Although the
United States was not a party to the Treaty of Berlin, it became concerned over the
extent to which Rumania was flouting its obligations under the agreement. In 1902 the
United States sent a note to its consul in Athens, with copies to all the signatories of the
treaty, urging that tha Powers call upon Rumania to honor its obligations by treating its
Jews more humanely. Feinberg, supra note 43, at 493-94. Even before the signing of the
Treaty of Berlin, the United States had been concerned about the fate of Jews in
Rumania. In 1870 President Grant appointed Benjamin Peixotto as consul in Rumania to
operate on behalf of the Jews. Id. at 492-93. See also C. ADLER & A. CARCALITH, WITH
FIRMNESS IN THE RIGHT: AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AFFECTING JEWS (1946) and

(L. Henkin ed. 1972). Concerning the effect
which the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Reform Act 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2432
(1974) has had on the position of Jews in Rumania, see Note, An Interim Analysis of the
Effects of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment on Trade and Human Rights: The Romanian
WORLD POLITICS AND THE JEWISH CONDITION

Example, 8 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 193 (1976).

63. 2 L. GREENBERG, THE JEWS IN RUSSIA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EMANCIPATION 19
(1951).
64. See THOMSON, supra note 36, at 469-70. The contrast between the erstwhile
humaneness of Turkish rule and the savagery inspired by the feelings of nationalism was
quite sharp. During the centuries of warfare between the Hapsburgs and the Ottomans
for the possession of the Balkan Peninsula, many Protestants in Transylvania and
Hungary preferred the crescent to the cross for the simple reason that it was the
Hapsburgs' avowed policy to stamp out all Christian rivals to Roman Catholicism in
newly conquered lands. H. FISHER, supra note 10, at 813.
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liberty. 65 That same conference declared that the Powers should favor
and aid the work of religious missions and all institutions tending to the
66
education of natives.
This paternalistic approach of the Powers did not end with the
close of the Nineteenth Century. In fact, it became more widespread
than ever after World War I with the establishment of the League of
Nations minority treaty system. At the Paris Peace Conference, there
was intense concern over minority problems. One group expressing
such concern was the Committee of Jewish Delegations.67 Nine newlycreated states were required to commit themselves to the guarantee of
68
certain rights, among them religious freedom, to all of their citizens.
The states which made such promises regarded them as badges of
inferiority and objected to the fact that the Powers appeared none too
anxious to make similar commitments themselves. The minorities
guarantee system had its one major triumph in the area of religious
freedom when the Permanent Court of International Justice found that
Albania had violated its declaration to the League Council 69 when it
abolished its private school system.7" In spite of this one triumph, the
minorities guarantee system did not work well. 7
The minorities approach to human rights issues was completely
discredited by World War II. The cynical manipulation of the problem
by Hitler was evident in his supposed concern at the Munich conferBENTWICH, supra note 28, at 223.
66. Id. at 225-26.
67. Feinberg, supra note 43, at 498.
68. The nine were: Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Turkey. In addition, five states made special declarations
before the Council of the League of Nations. They were Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Albania, and Iraq. Germany made a similar guarantee in the form of the German-Polish
Convention on Upper Silesia, which applied only to that area, thus leaving the bulk of
German Jews during the inter-war period without any protection from conventional
international law. From this pattern one can discern what privileges accompany a status
of seniority in the community of nations. Germany, even after losing World War I, was
not required to make a general commitment submitting its religious policies to international supervision.
69. Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools in Albania, [19351 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B,
No. 64.

65.

70. The private school systems were generally run by the various religious communities.
71. Concerning the minorities treaties system, see J. STONE, INTERNATIONAL
GUARANTIES OF MINORITIES RIGHTS (1932); M. MOSKOWITZ, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 117-23 (1958); T. BAGLEY, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF NATIONAL
MINORITIES (1950); I. CLAUDE, NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM
(1955); T. MODEEN, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF MINORITIES IN EUROPE (1969);
D. SEN, THE PROBLEM OF MINORITIES (1940); J. ROBINSON, WERE THE MINORITIES
TREATIES A FAILURE?

(1943); and P. de

AZCARATE, LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND NATIONAL

MINORITIES (1945).
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ence over the rights of the German minority in the Sudentenland of
Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the policy of according special attention to the problems of minorities had a beneficial effect in that it
showed the world just how dangerous such an approach was to human
rights issues. The time finally had come to take a universalist approach
to human rights issues in general and to the problem of religious
freedom in particular.
III.

THE EARLY POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD

After World War II the time-honored method of advancing human
rights by imposing obligations on losing states continued with the
inclusion of guarantees of religious liberty in the Paris Peace Treaties
of 1947 with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Rumania. Unlike
the minorities treaties, these post-World War II agreements contained
no guarantee provisions on the part of the United Nations.
The ineffectiveness of this latest spate of treaty guarantees was
established when allegations arose in 1949 that Hungary, Rumania,
and Bulgaria were violating their commitments thereunder. A series of
diplomatic notes emanated from the United States and the United
Kingdom, supported by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, charg72
ing the three states with systematically violating their obligations.
Replies by the three denied the allegations and alleged interference in
their domestic affairs. The United States and the United Kingdom
found these replies to be unsatisfactory and proposed that arbitration
commissions be set up as provided for in the treaties. The commissions
were to consist of three members. Each party to the dispute would
appoint one commissioner, and a third would be chosen either by
agreement of the two parties or, failing such agreement, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The three states denied the existence of any dispute and refused to appoint any commissioners.
The United Nations General Assembly then requested an advisory
opinion from the International Court of Justice on 1) whether or not
disputes that were subject to the resolution procedures outlines in the
treaties existed, 2) whether the three states were obligated to appoint
their commissioners, 3) if so obligated, whether the Secretary-General
could appoint the "third" commissioner without the delinquent party
having made its appointment, and 4) whether the resulting two person
commission, consisting of the one Western-appointed commissioner
and one appointed by the United Nations, would be legally competent
72. Hudson, The Twenty-eighth Year of the World Court, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2526 (1950).
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to give a decision." The Court answered the first two questions in the
affirmative 74 and the last two in the negative." Thus, the hope of
advancing religious freedom by treaties with individual states effec76
tively perished.
In the meantime, the United Nations had embarked on an entirely
different strategy in attempting to build a legal norm of universal
application. The first step in this arduous process came in 1948 with
the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights17 by the
United Nations General Assembly. This was the first authoritative
pronouncement that a general principle of religious freedom was
emerging in international law. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration
provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; the right includes freedom to change his religion
or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
During that same year, the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was promulgated, giving protection, in article 2, to religious groups "as such" .78 Other international
conventions which treat religious issues to some extent include: the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951),9 the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954), 8 the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (1958),81 the Convention Against Discrimination in Education (1960) ,82 and the Interna73. G.A. Res. 294, U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 16 (1949).
74. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, [1950]
I.C.J. 65.

75. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, [1950]
I.C.J. 221.
76. For further commentary on this dispute, see Liang, Observance in Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Request for an
Advisory Opinion on Certain Questions, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 100 (1950); Carlston,
Interpretationof Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, 44 AM. J. INT'L
L. 728 (1950); Lalive, Interpretation of Peace Treaties Signed with Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania, 77 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1228 (1950); and Tamm, Observ-

ance of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms in Bulgaria, Romania, andHungary
in Relation to the Peace Treaties and the United Nations' Charter, Jus GENTIUM:
NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET 359 (1949).

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
G.A. Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 174 (1948), 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
189 U.N.T.S. 137.
360 U.N.T.S. 117.
362 U.N.T.S. 31.
429 U.N.T.S. 93.
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tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).83
These conventions all adopted the approach of stipulating
that a
person's religion should not be used as a basis for discriminating
against him. The underlying concern was the allowance of liberty of
conscience to individuals. In the mid-1950s, however, the United
Nations began to tread on more controversial ground by addressing the
problem of guaranteeing persons the right to exercise or "manifest"
their religion in a meaningful way, even if the granting of such a right
were to necessitate transferring some of the natural prerogatives of
governments to churches.
In 1956 the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities appointed Mr. Arcot Krishnaswami as
special rapporteur to study the problem of religious discrimination. His
final report in 196014 was basically optimistic and reached the conclusion that there was a discernable trend toward greater religious toleration.85 This report, known as the Krishnaswami Report, formed the
basis of the Sub-Commission's draft principles on freedom and nondiscrimination in the matter of religious rights and practices. 8 6 The full
Commission on Human Rights considered these draft principles at its
1962 session. 87 It was expected that these draft principles would
ultimately be embodied in a United Nations declaration, or if not a
declaration, then at least in a recommendation to member states. There
was no expectation that these draft principles would be embodied in a
convention because the "general view" was that there was not to be an
88
instrument with binding legal force.
However while this work was taking place, a rash of anti-Semitic
outbreaks occurred in 1959 and 1960 which had the effect of elevating
the problem to a more urgent level. It was becoming increasingly
apparent that the right of religious liberty was in a more precarious
condition than it hitherto had been supposed.
83. See

HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE

UNITED NATIONS 18, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/I (1973).
84.

A.

KRISHNASWAMI, REPORT ON STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF

RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND PRACTICES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev. I (1960). For a

study of discrimination by, rather than against, churches, see Shelton, Human Rights
within Churches: A Survey Concerning Discrimination within Religious Organizations,6
HUMAN RIGHTS J. 487 (1973).

85. A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 84, at 55-60.
86. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/800 (1960).
87.

COMMISSION

ON

HUMAN RIGHTS,

REPORT ON THE EIGHTEENTH

SESSION,

34

U.N. ESCOR, SuPP. (No. 8) 13, U.N. Doc. E/3616/REv.I (1962).
88. Id. at 15.
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IV.

THE PRESENT IMPASSE

89

In 1962 the General Assembly began considering the question of
religious toleration. The Assembly first handed the issue to the
Economic and Social Council, requesting that it delegate the task of
composing preliminary drafts of a declaration and a convention pertaining to religious discrimination to the Commission on Human
Rights.' The Commission on Human Rights, in turn, asked the SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities to undertake the project. 9 '
A.

The 1964 Draft Declaration

The Sub-Commission submitted a draft declaration in 1964,92 and
the Commission appointed a working group to study it. The working
group merely revised the first six articles of93the Sub-Commission draft,
and this was the extent of their "study".
A comparison of the revised six articles with the original six
indicates that the fundamental uncertainty about the meaning of reli94
gious freedom as set out at the beginning of this article still is extant.
There was scant dispute on the subject of individual liberty of conscience. States appeared willing to grant that much, at least on paper.
The major dilemma was the factor which played a minimal role in the
Western struggle for religious toleration, but which played a more
substantial role in the East: the problem of how much autonomy to
grant to churches as institutions to function free from, or even in
competition with governments.
In its 1964 draft declaration, the Sub-Commission stated a very
89. See generally, Claydon, The Treaty of Protection of Religious Rights: U.N.
Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 403 (1971).
90. G.A. Res. 1781, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) 33, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
91. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE NINETEENTH SESSION, 36 U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 8) 78, U.N. Doc. E/3743 (1964). The Commission retained the
earlier problem of the draft principles on freedom and nondiscrimination in the matter of
religious rights and practices on its agenda. However, it continuously postponed further
debate on the subject after 1962 and finally, in 1969, declined to even include it on its
agenda.
92. See Appendix One of this article infra; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/873 (1963), reprinted in COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE TWENTIETH SESSION, 37 U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 8) 70-75, U.N. Doc. E/3873 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as SubCommission Draft].
93. See Appendix Two of this article infra; U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/873 (1963), reprinted in COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE TWENTIETH SESSION, 37 U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 8) 75-77, U.N. Doc. E/3873 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the
Working Group Draft].
94. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
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broad interpretation of religious freedom. Article VI stated that a
person has the "right to comply with what is prescribed by his
religion," 95 which is potentially a very far-reaching right indeed.
Additionally, article VI provided the right "to form and maintain
communities and institutions.' '96 These religious communities were
explicitly granted five rights under article VI. First was the right of
"[e]very religious community and institution . . .to form territorial
federations on a national, regional or local basis;" 97 and second was
the right of "[elvery religious group or community . . .to write, to
print and to publish religious books and texts and . . .to train the
personnel required for the performance of its practices or
rites .... "98 Article VI additionally provided that "no religious
group or community shall be prevented from bringing teachers from
abroad. . . ,,99 and that "every religious group or community shall
be enabled to have contacts with communities and institutions belonging to the same religion abroad. I Finally article VI assured the right
of "any religious community ..
to acquire and produce all materials
and objects necessary for the observance of prescribed ritual or practices, including dietary practices."1 0 '
Article VI of the Sub-Commission draft also provided the following rights for individuals: 1) the freedom to associate with fellow
believers, without any limitation on number; 2) the right to teach one's
beliefs in public; 3) the right to observe the dietary practices of one's
faith; 4) the right to have the state "help provide" objects and possessions necessary for the rituals of one's faith if the state "controls the
means of production and distribution;" 5) the right of pilgrimmage; 6)
the right of legal protection for sacred places and objects; 7) and the
right to have "due account" taken of the holy days and rest days of
one's faith. 102
The working group appointed by the full Commission modified
these liberal provisions substantially. Instead of conferring the right to
form communities, institutions, and federations, the revised article VI
guaranteed the freedom "to assemble". The freedom to teach one's
religion was maintained, but without a specific provision that this
freedom be exercisable in public. The right to publish religious reading
95. Sub-Commission Draft, supra note 92, at 72. See Appendix One, art. VI, of this
article infra.
96. See Appendix One, art. VI (2), of this article infra.
97. Id., art. VI(2)(ii).
98. Id., art. VI(4).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id., art. VI(5)(i).
102. Id., art. VI generally.
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matter became simply the right "to disseminate". The right to train
and to import religious personnel from abroad went unmentioned, as
did the right of pilgrimmage and the right of legal protection for holy
places and objects. Dietary practices and religious holidays were' not
mentioned explicitly, although these concepts arguably could be considered to have been subsumed into the category of "freedom to
observe the rites or customs" of a faith. The right to expect socialist
states to help supply worshippers with necessary ritual objects was
omitted. 0 3
B.

The 1965 Draft Convention

While the working group of the full Commission was revising its
original draft declaration, the Sub-Commission was at work on a draft
convention, which it completed and sent to the Commission in
1965. ! ' Rather than appoint a working group to consider this new
document, the Commission itself proceeded to consider and modify
it. 105

An extensive comparison of the two convention drafts would not
be fruitful at this stage because the likelihood of the convention being
approved in the near future is remote. However, several details pertaining to the two drafts are worthy of mention. First, there are subtle
"ideological" differences between the two versions; and second, there
are three different respects in which the Commission's draft is more
liberal, and three other areas in which the Commission's draft is less
liberal.
With regard to the first, the "ideological" difference between the
two drafts is hardly a striking one, but it is revealing. The SubCommission's draft convention would have had all forms of religious
discrimination condemned and simultaneously would have committed
states to undertake to eliminate the phenomenon. 10 The full Commission draft, on the other hand, took a somewhat more doctrinaire
approach in that it "recognize[d] that the religion or belief of an
103. Working Group Draft, supra note 93, at 75-77. See Appendix Two, art. VI, of
this article infra.
104. E/CN.4/882 and Corr. 1 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as Sub-Commission
Draft Convention]. See also Staff Study, United Nations Draft InternationalConvention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance, 6 J.INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 288
(1965) and Abram, Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion, 8 (No. 2) J. INT'L
COMM'N JURISTS 40 (1967).
105. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE TWENTY-THIRD SESSION, 42
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 6) 30-35, U.N. Doc. E/4322 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as
Full Commission Draft Convention].
106. Sub-Commission Draft Convention, supra note 104, at art. 2.
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individual is a matter for his own conscience and must be respected
accordingly." 10 7 The difference is a subtle one; while one text sought
to attack a phenomenon or practice of states, the other recognized a
right belonging to individuals.
As to other differences between the two convention drafts, the full
Commission's convention draft offered broader protection than the
Sub-Commission's draft in three instances. First, article 3(l)(g) in the
full Commission draft granted to believers the "freedom to organize
and maintain local, regional, national and international associations, "108 while the Sub-Commission's draft failed to extend the principle to that extent. The Sub-Commission's draft would have allowed
the formation of local, regional, and national associations only, and
then would have restricted persons to the right merely "to participate
in international associations." 109 The second instance in which the full
Commission took a more liberal approach was in article 10 of the full
Commission draft, which would have guaranteed "effective protection
and relief" for violations of the rights secured by the document; 1 0 the
Sub-Commission's draft article 10 mentioned only "appropriate remedial relief".". 1 The third example of broader protection afforded by the
full Commission was in article 11, which concerned the right of states
to derogate from the convention. While both drafts specified that
considerations of national security and friendly relations between nations can justify derogation, the Sub-Commission draft additionally
would have countenanced states prohibiting religious activity aimed at
prejudicing "national sovereignty"." 2 On the other hand, the full
Commission draft would have allowed only such derogation as would
be necessary to promote the "purposes and principles of the United
3
Nations. "'
The final area in which the two convention drafts differ pertains
to the protection to be afforded to religious freedom. In this respect the
Sub-Commission's draft is broader, and there are three differences the
exemplify this point. First, the Sub-Commission draft protected a
person against being compelled "to undergo a religious marriage
ceremony not in conformity with his religion or belief.""14 The Com107.
108.
109.
110.

Full Commission
Id.
Sub-Commission
Full Commission
1Il. Sub-Commission
112. Id.
113. Full Commission
114. Sub-Commission

Draft Convention, supra note 105.
Draft Convention, supra note 104.
Draft Convention, supra note 105.
Draft Convention, supra note 104.
Draft Convention, supra note 105.
Draft Convention, supra note 104, at art. 3 (1) (i).
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mission draft had no corresponding article. Second, article 8 of the
Sub-Commission's draft would have criminalized all incitement to
religious hatred, 115 but corresponding article 9 of the Commission draft
would have done so only for incitement "likely to result in acts of
violence against any religion. . . or its adherents . ...- ,116 Finally,
the Sub-Commission draft had a provision disallowing governments
from favoring any religion over another through such channels as
subsidies and tax concessions unless it is "provided for by law for
reasons of public interest. ...
,,"'" which is a substantial exception.
The corresponding section of the full Commission draft protects not
religions, but rather individuals against discrimination that is religiously motivated. 118
It is difficult to conclude that one of the two convention drafts is
superior to the other. However, it is reasonable to conclude that the
Sub-Commission draft tended to go further than that of the full Commission in protecting institutional or group rights, as opposed to
individual rights.

C. Reaction of the Roman Catholic Church
The most significant event regarding this institutional versus
individual rights dilemma was the issuance by the Roman Catholic
Church of its Declaration of Religious Freedom of 1965,119 a product of
the Vatican II Conference. Prior to this time, the Roman Catholic
Church, in contrast to various Jewish organizations, had taken relatively little interest in the United Nations' efforts. Now, however, it was
prepared to enter the struggle for religious freedom with all of the
spiritual, popular, political, and financial resources at its disposal.12 0
The Roman Catholic Church was not reticent or uncertain about
what it believed religious freedom to mean. As one of the most
115. Id.
116. Full Commission Draft Convention, supra note 105.
117. Sub-Commission Draft Convention, supra note 104, at art. 9.
118. Full Commission Draft Convention, supra note 105, at art. 5.
119. A declaration is the least authoritative pronouncement to emanate from a
Roman Catholic Church Council. It is inferior to both a decree (decretum) and to a
constitution (constitutio). G. MENSCHING, TOLERATION AND TRUTH IN RELIGION 7

(1971). It is important to note that the declaration involved no relaxation of the doctrine
that the Roman Catholic Church is the exclusive means to salvation. On the contrary, it
affirmed that the "only true religion has its concrete form of existence in the Catholic
and Apostolic Church." Id. at 53. See also de Albornoz, Ecumenical and World
Significance of the Vatican Declaration on Religious Liberty, 18 ECUMENICAL REV. 58

(1966).
120. On the extent of the material power and the organizational framework of the
Roman Catholic Church, see PALLENBERG, supra note 61.
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institutionalized of all of the churches of the world, it became a
primary spokesman for the viewpoint that religious freedom means the
right of churches to function without undue government interference.
In comments which it submitted to the Secretary-General,"'2 the Holy
See frankly objected to the United Nations' adopting "too individual a
conception of religious freedom." Among the rights which it felt
should be guaranteed were (1) the right of the clergy to choose its
personnel autonomously, (2) the right of church members to communicate with co-religionists abroad, (3) the right to erect religious buildings, (4) the right of churches to acquire funds and property, (5) the
right of the clergy to teach, (6) the right of churches to transfer their
personnel from state to another, (7) the right of persons to choose their
own life style, including a monastic one, (8) the right of individuals to
contribute to private charities, and (9) the right of individuals to refuse
military service on the grounds of conscientious objection, provided
122
they agree to serve the state in some alternate fashion.
D. Reaction of the Soviet Union Bloc
If the proponents of the "institutional" view of religious freedom
had won a valuable convert to their ranks in the Roman Catholic
Church, the opposition had been active as well. Chief among the
opponents was the Soviet bloc. A totalitarian state has an obvious
interest in seeing that the notion of religious toleration does not entail
granting to a nongovernmental, internationally-oriented organization,
such as a church, the right to compete with it for the loyalty of its
citizens. The Soviet bloc therefore has found itself in the uncomfortable position of having either to confine the basic concept of religious
freedom to be acceptable to it, or to oppose religious freedom outright.
It is not surprizing that the former alternative was chosen. Specifically,
the Soviet bloc has put forth three of its own interpretations as to what
this highly problematic freedom means.
First, they advanced the notion that freedom of religion must
entail the freedom of the individual to refuse to adhere to any religion
at all, if he so wishes. However, this position is only an extension of
the notion of liberty of conscience. 123 No matter how ironic it may be
to find the Soviet bloc advocating such a principle, the Western states
had no trouble making an accommodation in this area. In proceedings
121. U.N. Doc. A/9134 (1973).
122. Id.
123. It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union wished to delete the words

"freedom of conscience" from the declaration text. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Dec.
1967, at 85.
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of the Third Committee of the General Assembly on this subject, they
simply agreed to add a specific provision to the effect that the principle
of religious toleration extended as well to atheistic beliefs. A General
Assembly resolution of 1967 noted this change.124
The Soviet bloc had a second issue, however, which was the
doctrine concerning the separation of Church and State. Ukraine proposed an amendment to the declaration and stated the problem in the
following terms:
The church shall be separated from the State and the School
from the Church. .

.

.No single church, religion or reli-

gious organization shall or may be accorded privileges of any
kind or be subject to restrictions of any kind in its activities. 125
Both the Sub-Commission and the full Commission convention drafts
included provisions to the effect that
[n]either the establishment of a religion nor the recognition
of a religion or belief by a State nor the separation of Church
from State shall by itself be considered religious intolerance
or discrimination on the ground of religion or
belief. . ..."126
There is some support for the Ukrainian point of view. McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen describe the Commission provision as "an
unfortunate departure from the conventional wisdom .... "127
Nevertheless, the Commission's approach is the more rational one. It
would be dangerous to condemn a de jure link between Church and
State without addressing the question of whether the link, in fact, does
lead to discrimination against unestablished religions or their adherents. There appears to be no logical or historical reason why a state
with an established church, or even a theocracy, cannot be tolerant of
nonconformists.

1 28

The experience involving the enforcement efforts of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination1 29 is illustrative of the problems encountered by placing too
much reliance on an analysis of "official" state policy. The deliberations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
the enforcing body of the convention, have tended to revolve around
124. G.A. Res. 2295, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 38, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
125. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1145 (1973).
126. See note 105 supra.
127. McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 54, at 890.
128. See note 4 supra.
129. G.A. Res. 2106 (Annex), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965); 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
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analyses of state constitutional and legislative provisions rather than
around the reality of violations of the convention. 13 1 The United
Nations could profit from this example and give states as little opportunity as possible to "comply" with human rights norms by taking
purely pro forma measures.
There is an additional irony in this second Soviet proposal in that
it represents a stance quite different from that which the Soviet Union
maintains in practice. A recent report on the state of religious freedom
in the Soviet Union was presented to the World Council of Churches
documenting the intense involvement of the Soviet state in religious
affairs. For example, Soviet law does not recognize churches as
national organizations, but only as individual congregations. Even
these congregations are not permitted to exist without permission from
the Council on Religious Affairs in Moscow. In order to obtain this
permission, the potential worshippers must first register officially, and
then obtain an officially approved "prayer building", which in turn,
will be rented from the authorities. After taking these steps, the group
is then considered to be a "cult", which is a pejorative word in the
communist vocabulary. The priest who officiates is legally an employee of the congregation's executive, which is a collective body whose
members may not be elected by secret ballot and whose selection is
subject to the veto of the Council on Religious Affairs. Inside the
"prayer building", the priest may not teach any kind of religious
dogma, and he must have official permission if he is to administer
sacraments outside of his approved area. All religious objects used in
the services belong to the state, and are subject to repossession at any
time. II
130. See the various annual reports which have been submitted by the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to the General Assembly.
131. The Economist, Aug. 21, 1976, at 44, col. 3. Concerning the problems which the
various religions have had in co-existing with the Soviet state, see J. CURTISS, THE
RUSSIAN CHURCH AND THE SOVIET STATE, 1917-1950 (1953); L. GREENBERG, supra note
63; M. SPINKA, THE CHURCH IN SOVIET RUSSIA (1956); W. KOLARZ, RELIGION IN THE
SOVIET UNION (1962); THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND RELIGION (B. Szczesniak ed.
1959); S. TIMASHEV, RELIGION IN SOVIET RUSSIA (1917-1942) (1943); THE JEWS IN SOVIET
RUSSIA SINCE 1917 (L. Kochan ed. 1970); R. CONQUEST, RELIGION IN THE USSR (1968);
Bociurkiw, The Shaping of Soviet Religious Policy, 22 (No. 3) PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM
37 (1973); Fletcher, Religious Dissent in the USSR in the 1960s, 30 SLAVIC REV. 298
(1971); Religious Dissent, 17 (No. 4) PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 21 (1968); Powell, The
Effectiveness of Soviet Anti-Religious Propaganda, 31 PUBLIC OPINION 366 (1967);
Rothenberg, Status of Cults, 16 (No. 5) PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 119 (1967); Gitelman,
The Jews, 19 (No. 5) PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 92 (1967); Lawrence, Soviet Policy
Towards the Russian Churches, 1958-1946, 16 SOVIET STUD. 276 (1965); THE UNREDEEMED; ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE SOVIET UNION (R. Rubin, ed. 1968); and T. TAYLOR,
COURTS OF TERROR; SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND JEWISH EMIGRATION (1976). The

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol7/iss3/8

30

Neff: An Evolving International Legal Norm of Religious Freedom: Proble
AN EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL NORM

Thus, the fact that Church and State are theoretically separate in
the Soviet Union does not mean that there exists an appreciable degree
of religious freedom. The focus of the international community should
be to attack the facts of religious intolerance and not the mere formalities of Church-State ties.
The Soviet Union's third assertion is a claim that the right of
religious toleration is not a one-way street and that the state has a right
to pursue its own legitimate goals such as social equality, or domestic
and international peace, free from any subversive tactics by religious
groups. The Soviet Union has pressed for guarantees in the declaration
that the freedom of religion not be used to mask political movements or
to instill hatred between peoples or between religious or ethnic
groups. 132 This could be interpreted as a frank acknowledgment of the
standing threat that religious organizations pose to governments.
The Soviet Union found an ideal issue in the last-mentioned
concept that a state also has a right to pursue its own legitimate goals
free from the influence of religious groups. Here is an issue that could
attract a broad spectrum of support. It is a stance that carries strong
appeal to Third World states which have believed that missionaries and
religions served first as trailblazers and then as ideological bulwarks of
colonialism. 133
Soviet Union has not always been content with the policy of merely creating difficulties
for churches. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Kruschev embarked on a campaign

of outright persecution. One indication of the determination with which the state confronted the churches is found in the fact that from 1959 to 1962, the number of church
buildings in the Soviet Union was reduced from 22,000 to 11,500. An indication of the
suspicion with which the state looks upon synagogues in particular is found in the fact
that as of 1967, only 60 were licensed to exist in all of the Soviet Union. In the late 1920s,
however, there had been some 500 in Byelorussia alone. Gitelman, The Jews, 19 (No. 5)
PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 92 (1967).

132. Similar beliefs have surfaced in the draft of the new Soviet constitution which
was published in June 1977. It provides that "the exercise of rights and freedoms shall be
inseparable from the performance by citizens of their duties." N.Y. Times, June 4, 1977,
at 1, col. i.
133. See L. WRIGHT, RELIGION AND EMPIRE; THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN PIETY AND
COMMERCE IN ENGLISH EXPANSION, 1558-1625 (1943); P. COHEN, CHINA AND CHRISTIANITY; THE MISSIONARY MOVEMENT AND THE GROWTH OF CHINESE ANTI-FOREIGNISM
(1963); J. SCHERER, MISSIONARY, Go HOME! A REAPPRAISAL OF THE CHRISTIAN WORLD
MISSION (1964); J. AJAYI, CHRISTIAN MISSIONS IN NIGERIA, 1841-1891; THE MAKING OF A
NEW ELITE (1965); R. ROTBERG, CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES AND THE CREATION OF NORTHERN RHODESIA, 1880-1924 (1965); J. MACDONALD, TRADE, POLITICS AND CHRISTIANITY
IN AFRICA AND THE EAST

(1969); J.

GRABILL, PROTESTANT DIPLOMACY AND THE NEAR

EAST: MISSIONARY INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN POLICY, 1810-1927 (1971); G. MOORHOUSE,
THE MISSIONARIES (1973); S. LATUKEFU, CHURCH AND STATE IN TONGA: THE WESLEYAN
METHODIST MISSIONARIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1822-1875 (1974); and D. MARKOWITZ, CROSS AND SWORD: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS IN THE BELGIAN CONGO, 1908-1960 (1973).
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Other states that could readily find Soviet fears to be justified are
conservative states, such as the Islamic nations. A declaration on
religious freedom, particularly the type desired by the Roman Catholic
Church, would be a threat to them if it provided for such rights as a
right to federate, a right to assemble with one's co-religionists abroad,
and a right of pilgrimage. These last two rights could allow subversive
ideas to filter into the state under the guise of religious discussion. 34
Finally, the Soviet stance is attractive to totalitarian states,
whether they be of the left or the right, particularly those that are
heavily Roman Catholic. For example, both Brazil' 35 and the Philippines' 36 have voiced fears quite similar to those of the Soviet Union in
this regard.
E. Other Problems Facing the Establishment of
An InternationalNorm of Religious Toleration
The problem of religious toleration is that it cannot attract support
in the same way that, for example, a crusade against racial discrimination can. This is because the goal of toleration for all religions is
unlikely to appeal to those who would be the most obvious beneficiaries-religious persons. Perhaps it is asking too much of a believer that he exert himself to protect other faiths when he profoundly
believes them to be erroneous. The Islamic world, particularly Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, and Libya, where fundamentalism is a potent political
force, provides some illustrations of this phenomenan. In 1973 the
world witnessed a riot in Horns, Syria where twenty-three people were
killed and fifty injured while protesting the "laxness" of the ruling
regime's religious policy. One indication of this "laxness" had been
37
the government's issuance of a decree of religious toleration.1
Another serious problem with which the advocates of toleration
must deal is the fact that their own approach to the issue is essentially
nonreligious. For example, McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen point to
134.

See Borthwick, Islamic Sermon as a Channel of Political Communication, 21

MIDDLE EAST J. 299 (1967).

135. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/I145, at 13 (1973). Concerning Church-State relations in
Brazil, see Kiemen, Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church, 32
AMERICAS 134 (1975).
136. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/145, at 18 (1973).
137. N.Y. Times, Mar. I1, 1973, at IV, 11, col. I. Concerning the general relationship between government and religion in Syria, see Kelidar, Religion andState in Syria,
61 ASIAN AFFAIRS 16 (1974). In 1977 Egypt also showed signs of moving away from the
dogmatic secularism of the Nasser era and toward traditional Islamic legal principles.
The Times, July 16, 1977, at 6, col. 1. Most disturbing was a proposed law mandating the
death penalty for apostacy from Islam.
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the "specious nature of claims to a monopoly of truth" and to the
freedom of individuals "to pursue .their own search to relate the ego to
other beings and to the universal manifold of events." 13 A secular
lawyer brought up in a pluralist, empiricist society would find such an
argument reasonable enough. 13 9 On the other hand, a religious person
might feel that a universal norm of religious toleration necessarily
carries the unacceptable implication that other beliefs are as "true" or
as "worthwhile" as his own.
It could be validly argued that the principle of religious toleration
does not involve such a value judgment and that it is simply a principle
by which to organize a stable and rational international order. This
argument, while tempting, is unacceptable because it is consistent with
the proposition that governments can place mild disincentives against
"wrong faiths", such as not allowing tax exemption to "false" faiths
or publicly encouraging citizens to enroll in one particular church.
The implication that a norm of absolute religious neutrality by
states will place all religions on an equal footing is unavoidable. The
legal community of Western society could easily rally to such a
proposition, but it should not be too surprised to find itself relatively
alone.
F

Recent Developments

Because of the fundamental problems outlined above facing the
United Nations, activity concerning the area of religious freedom
138. McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 54, at 874-75.
139. For a penetrating analysis of the extent to which the notion of toleration of
opposing points of view is a specifically Western, liberal, pluralist, and perhaps outdated
point of view, see Wolff, Beyond Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE (R.
Wolff, B. Moore, & H. Marcuse eds. 1965). See also Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in
id. For a classic exposition of the thesis that all ideas should be allowed to compete
against each other on an equal basis with no more than their own intrinsic merits

supporting them, see J.

MILL,

ON

LIBERTY

(1859). For the expression of a similar

philosophy of toleration, see Beach, Basis of Tolerance in a Democratic Society: True
and Counterfeit Tolerance, 57 ETHICS 157 (1947). For a defense of the Mill position and

an attack on the critiques of Wolff and Marcuse, see Spitz, Pure Tolerance: A Critique of
Criicism, 21 DISSENT 259 (1974). There is an argument presented in J. RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 206, 214-16 (1971) which purports not to be based on either skepticism or
indifference towards religion. The argument presented, however, involves reasoning
from an "original position" in which no one knows in advance what his own religious
beliefs are to be. Therefore it appears to be a trifle artificial and is unlikely to appeal to a
devout person. For a critique of the Rawls position, see Dworkin, Non-neutral Principles, 71 J. PHIL. 491 (1974).
From a historical viewpoint, we may note that the original justifications which were

posited for religious toleration are not appealing to secular thinkers today. The origin of
the ideology of toleration was two-fold, with one basis in the mysticism of the German
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ground to a halt in the late 1960s. The working group of the Commission never went beyond its revisions of the first six articles of the SubCommission's 1964 draft declaration nor of the Sub-Commission's
1965 draft convention. The idea of establishing an international legal
norm of religious toleration began to look like one whose time would
never come.
A fresh start on the project, however, was begun in the early
1970s. A movement was instigated to have a declaration passed by the
General Assembly in time for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
Universal Declaration in 1973. Even though this goal proved to be too
ambitious, the General Assembly did decide to give the matter priority
in 1972. 1' Then in 1973, the General Assembly presented the problem
once again to the Commission on Human Rights, directing it to submit
a draft declaration to the Twenty-ninth Session of the General Assemto
bly in 1974. The General Assembly also invited member states
14
comment on the work that had been done to date in the field.n
In 1974 the Commission on Human Rights established a new
working group to carry out this new assignment. In its first session in
1974, the new group adopted a title for the draft declaration: Draft
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. The group also adopted the
first paragraph of the preamble to the draft declaration.1 42 By 1977 this
draft preamble had been completed, 143 and the working group then
began the preliminary discussion of the substantive portion of the
declaration.
Although the working group is far from completing its appointed
task, and because no standing United Nations body has passed on the
work completed to date, any assessment of progress is necessarily
tentative. Nevertheless, there are four points pertaining to the new
draft preamble which are worthy of note.
Sebastien Franck and the other in the neo-Platonic-cum-humanist tradition which
originated in the neo-Platonic academy of Renaissance Florence. See Sabine, The
Colloquium Heptaplomeres of Jean Bodin, in PERSECUTION AND LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF GEORGE LINCOLN BURR 271 (1931). Neither of these strains of thought find

much favor among international lawyers today. Concerning the inadequacy of the later
Lockean justification of toleration, see note 19 supra.
140. G.A. Res. 3027, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) 72, U.N. Doc. 8730 (1972).
141. G.A. Res. 3069, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) 77, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
142. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE THIRTIETH SESSION, 56 U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 5) 18-22, U.N. Doc. E/5464 (1974).
143. See Appendix Three of this article infra. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
REPORT ON THE THIRTY-THIRD SESSION, 62 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 6) 47-48, U.N.
Doc. E/5927 (1977).
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The first is that, unlike the Sub-Commission draft of 1964,' 44 this
new draft recognizes that "religion or belief . . . is one of the
fundamental elements . . . of life and . . . should be fully respected
and guaranteed."1 45 The 1964 draft differed in that it never spoke of a
right of religious freedom as an autonomous right, but only as an
integral part of the United Nations Charter and of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The difference may prove to be insignificant, but it may indicate a willingness on the working group's part to
view religious freedom as the unique problem that it undoubtedly is.
The second point concerning the draft preamble is the position
that it accords to the right to "manifest" one's beliefs. In 1975 the
group was working with two rival drafts-one submitted by the
Netherlands' and the other by Byelorussia. 147 The latter draft did not
contain the word "manifest", while the former draft posited the
existence of a "right to manifest one's religion or belief in worship,
observance, practise [sic] and teaching." The working group made an
uneasy compromise. In its final draft, the right to "manifest" one's
belief was incorporated, but only in such a context that it carries much
less force than it would have in the Netherlands draft:
Consideringthat the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenants on Human Rights proclaim
the principles of nondiscrimination and equality before the
law and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion
and belief, including the right to choose, manifest and
change one's religion or belief. '
The third point of interest concerns the final version of paragraph
5. Once again, there had been serious disagreement between the
preliminary drafts of the Netherlands and Byelorussia. The latter stated
that "[g]overnments, organizations and private persons should strive
• . . to combat any exploitation or abuse of religion or belief for
political or other ends inconsistent with the purpose and principles of
the present Declaration." 149 The Netherlands draft, on the other hand,
provided that "[g]overnments, organizations and private persons...
144. The draft completed by the working group which the commission had appointed
in 1964 did not contain a preamble. See text accompanying note 93 supra. Therefore,
that draft does not pertain to this discussion.
145. See Appendix Three, para. 4, of this article infra.
146. E/CN.4/L.1289/Add.1 (1975), reprinted in COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
REPORT ON THE THIRTY-FIRST SESSION, 58 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4) 38, U.N. Doc.
E/5635(1975).
147. E/CN.4/5464 (1975), reprinted in id. at 37.
148. See Appendix Three, para. 2, of this article infra.
149. See note 147 supra.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977

35

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3 [1977], Art. 8
578

CALIFORNIA

WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 7

should not engage in any activities or perform any acts aimed at the
destruction of any of the purposes and principles set forth in the present
Declaration. "15o' Although this difference in wording may appear trivial, it signifies a profound difference in approach to the issue of
religious toleration. In principle both drafts agree that the freedom of
religion should not be misused. However, the Byelorussian draft
betrays the fear that religion or belief itself might be misused, while
the Netherlands text displays no similar concern. The Netherlands
draft was primarily concerned with protecting religion from the State
or any other potentially hostile group; while the Byelorussian draft was
more concerned about protecting rival religions from each other,
though it is difficult to avoid suspecting that the real concern was about
protecting the State's interests from the activities of churches. In 1976
the working group, essentially adopted the Byelorussian version:
Considering that . . .the use of religion or belief for ends
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations . . . is
inadmissible. '1
The fourth point of interest concerning the draft preamble is the
disagreement which surfaced within the working group in 1977. This
disagreement centered around the text of a new paragraph 6 to the
preamble, which was to be inserted before the previously agreed upon
paragraph 6, but not to replace it. This proposed paragraph related
freedom of religion or belief to "the attainment of the goals of world
peace, social justice and friendship among peoples and to the elimination of ideologies or practices of colonialism and racial discrimination. "1 52 There was little dispute that the preamble should posit a link
between the two phenomena. The question was the form that this link
should take. Various Western states, and this included the Holy See,
believed that the paragraph should state that freedom of religion or
belief can or could make a contribution to the attainment of the other
goals mentioned, while various Soviet bloc texts held that freedom of
religion or belief should make such a contribution. 5 3 Once again, the
difference is subtle but significant. To one group, freedom of religion
is a goal which, although possibly useful in the struggle to achieve
other political, social, or economic ends, should be pursued for its own
sake. To the other group, freedom of religion is seen as useful primari150. See note 146 supra.
151. See note 143 supra.
152.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,

REPORT ON THE THIRTY-THIRD SESSION, 62

U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 6) 48, U.N. Doc. E/5927 (1977).
153. Id. at 44-47.
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ly in the pursuit of other, more urgent causes. The working group
adopted the Soviet bloc position on this question as well.
At its 1977 session, the working group began consideration of the
operative parts of the draft declaration. Scant progress was made, as
was evident in the fact that the group only met for four out of its five
scheduled meetings "owing to the heavy workload of the Commission." '1 54 The working group's only accomplishment in this area was
to hold a preliminary discussion on two rival drafts of first articles, one
submitted by Byelorussia and the other by Italy.' 55 No decision was
reached.
V.

CONCLUSION

As of mid-1977 the outlook for the future was hardly promising.
In three sessions the Commission on Human Rights has been able to
agree upon only a draft preamble to a declaration. This slow progress
indicates that we must expect a long wait until a convention containing
enforcement machinery is drafted, adopted by the General Assembly,
and ultimately ratified by enough states to take effect.
At first glance it appears difficult to explain how the United
Nations' efforts against racial discrimination could work out so differently from its efforts against religious intolerance. The Declaration
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 156 passed the
General Assembly as early as 1963. The Convention on Racial Discrimination1 57 was opened for signature in 1965 and came into force in
1969. Yet, more than eight years later, there is less than a complete
draft preamble prepared for a declaration on religious intolerance. The
reason for this striking difference should be apparent. The right to
religious freedom is a right that is unique in the international human
rights field, for it is not merely a right to have one's personal integrity
154. Id. at 46.
155. The Byelorussian draft article I read as follows:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom of theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs as far
as their choice and change are concerned, freedom to exercise and express
religious beliefs and freedom to express anti-religious views.
The Italian draft article I read as follows:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include, inter alia, freedom to adhere or not to adhere to a religion
or belief, to manifest and practise a religion or belief, or to change religion or
belief, in accordance with the dictates of his conscience, without being subjected to any coercion likely to impair his freedom of choice or decision in the
matter.
Id. at 45-46.
156. G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) 3-5, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
157. G.A. Res. 2106 (Annex), 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965); 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1965).
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protected against the instrusion of governments; it is also a right to owe
one's loyalty to a nongovernmental institution.
Therefore it is incorrect to take the position that "religious liberty
is simply civil liberty exercised in the field of religion." ' It is also
inadequate to view the problem in terms of preventing discrimination
against persons because of their religion.' 5 9 States have little trouble
conceding in principle that their citizens have the right to think and
believe as they wish, so long as the state retains the right to control the
conduct of nonbelievers. The wide array of sophisticated psychological weaponry that is available' 6° to the modern totalitarian state makes
it possible for states to negate, at least to some extent, any "right"
which an individual may have to stand aloof. 161 Thus, to make a grant
of liberty of conscience is a fairly safe thing for a state to do. However,
it is not safe for a state to grant a charter of liberty to a corporation,
such as a church, which ultimately may be hostile to it. The greater the
158. Garrison, Democratic Rights in the Roman Catholic Tradition, 15 CHURCH
HISTORY 195, 200 (1946).

159. McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 54, at 898 appear to take essentially
this position:
The demand to conform typically goes beyond insistence on verbal conformity; the words must also be uttered in tones that are recognized modes of
expressing conviction. "Tentativeness" arouses suspicions of disloyalty or
treason and the range of tolerance afforded to variety and deviation is narrowed ...
The contention of this article is that it is not "tentativeness" towards the established
creed that concerns governments so much as conviction in the cause of a rival faith.
160.

See, e.g., J. BROWN, TECHNIQUES OF PERSUASION (1963); J. MEERLOO, MENTAL

SEDUCTION AND MENTICIDE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT CONTROL AND BRAINWASH-

ING (1956); C. MILOSZ, THE ACTIVE MIND (1955); R. LIFrON, THOUGHT REFORM ANDTHE
PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM: A STUDY OF "BRAINWASHING"

IN CHINA (1961); R. HUNTER,

BRAINWASHING IN RED CHINA (1900); and T. BEISECKER, THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL
INFLUENCE: READINGS IN PERSUASION.

The psychological theory of cognitive dissonance theorizes about the relationship
between attitude and behavior; a change in the latter can work to effect a change in the
former, as well as vice versa. See L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE

(1954); Festinger & Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J.
ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCH. 203 (1959); J. BREHAM & A. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1962); Brock, Cognitive Restructuringand Attitude Change, 64
J. ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCH. (1962); Blum & Wright, Degreeof Effort and Attitude
Change Under Forced Compliance, I PSYCHONOMIC SCIENCE 67 (1964); Gollob & Dittes,
Different Effects of Manipulated Self-Esteem on PersuasibilityDependingon the Threat
and Complexity of the Communication, 2 J. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCH. 195
(1965); Helmrich & Collins, Studies in ForcedCompliance: Commitment and Magnitude
of Inducement to Comply As Determinants of Opinion Change, 10 J. PERSONALITY AND
SOCIAL PSYCH. 75 (1968); THEORIES OF COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY: A SOURCEBOOK (R.
Abelson & Others Eds. 1968); and C. KIESLER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMITMENT:
EXPERIMENTS LINKING BEHAVIOR To BELIEF (1971). The dividing line between belief and

behavior has been found to be not nearly so sharp as was once assumed.
161. For an exposition of the thesis that toleration is a non-neutral principle which,
in fact, works in favor of the established order, see Marcuse, supra note 139.
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wealth and influence of the corporation, and the more liberty it is
granted in its operations, the more has a state to fear from it.
The Western states, in a sense, have been singularly favored by
history to accept the principle of co-existence of Church and State. Out
of the appalling religious wars of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries emerged an "historic compromise" to the effect that both
Church and State were limited in power and that each should function
unhindered by the other in its own respective sphere. This compromise, although tacit, was nevertheless effective. In this case, however,
it was domestic experience and not international law which dictated
how this division of jurisdiction was to take place.
Eastern European and Middle Eastern states experienced no such
fortune. When the original millet system of dividing power between
strong churches and a weak imperial government was suddenly shattered in the Nineteenth Century by the onset of Western-style nationalism, they did not have two centuries of experience, as did the West, in
which to gradually settle upon a new, workable relationship between
State and Church. The achievement of an instant solution in this area
has been hopelessly complicated by the serious problems which nearly
all of the new states experienced with minority groups, which were
sometimes of minority faiths as well.
Under such circumstances, the imposition of legal obligations
upon these new and largely socialist states to uphold "freedom of
religion" had the major effect of discrediting altogether the notion of
international guarantees of religious liberty. At the time when promises of religious freedom were being written assiduously into the
constitutions of the various new states, the appalling spectacle of a
resurgence of anti-Semitism already had achieved the upper hand in
Eastern Europe. The new nation-states were indeed jealous gods.
The United Nations' attempts to formulate a universal norm of
religious toleration to replace the old ad hoc system of minority
guarantees is to be welcomed. However, much damage has already
occurred. Even before the rise of the totalitarianism of the Twentieth
Century, the experiences and interests of the East and West had
become deeply divergent. The communist governments of Eastern
Europe simply have continued the struggle for limited freedom for
churches which had begun in the last century.
In early 1976 then Ambassador to the Commission on Human
Rights, Leonard Garment, delivered a scathing public attack on the
extent to which the Commission had allowed its work to be influenced
by political factors. He made specific reference to the slowness of the
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progress in the area of religious freedom, terming it "a scandal of
neglect."' 6 2 He was correct in the sense that the world is justified to
consider the delay of approximately thirteen years in the formulation of
a declaration on religious freedom as excessive.
Yet "neglect" is not precisely the appropriate word to use.
Whatever the defects and faults of the Commission's proceedings,
utter indifference to the problem is not one of them. The divisions and
differences of opinion concerning the definition of religious freedom
are genuine and unlikely to be resolved quickly.
In a strange sense, there may be room for some optimism in the
slowness of the Commission's proceedings. Those states pressing so
strenuously for a narrow reading of religious toleration must feel that
the ultimate United Nations position on the subject will be more than a
mere academic construction or philosophical debating point. The reason is that this particular human right is unique in that it will be backed
up by something which many states genuinely fear-an organized
constituency. It is doubtful that there exists any organization or group
of organizations with so strong a hold on the hearts and minds of
persons the world over as the churches. To give the churches a legal
license to function autonomously in certain areas of life is among the
most dangerous threats that repressive states face. Therefore, we
should not anticipate speedy progress in this area, although progress
there has been. If the battle shows no immediate sign of ending,
perhaps we can take some comfort in that there are indications that it is
a battle worth fighting.

162. N.Y. Times, Feb. I, 1976, at 18, col. 3. On the other hand, in March 1977,
President Carter did not refer to the problem of religious discrimination in his speech to
the United Nations. 57 DEP'T STATE BULL. 229 (1977).
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APPENDIX ONE
THE SUB-COMMISSION'S 1964 DRAFT DECLARATION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE
The GeneralAssembly,
Consideringthat the Charter of the United Nations is based on the
principles of the dignity and equality of all human beings and seeks,
among other basic objectives, to achieve international co-operation in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,
Consideringthat the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth in the Declaration, without distinction of any kind, in particular
as to race, colour, religion or national origin,
Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims further that all are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to equal protection of the law and that all are
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination and against any
incitement to such discrimination,
Considering further that the right of everyone to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion has been proclaimed in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which right includes freedom to change
one's religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest one's religion or belief
in teaching, practice, worship or observance.
Noting that the disregard of human rights and fundamental freedoms through discrimination because of religion and the denial of the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion has brought in the
past untold sorrow to mankind by inflicting grievous suffering on those
who were its victims and in injuring those responsible for them,
Consideringthat in order to eliminate and prevent all such forms
of religions intolerance it is vital for Governments to take legislative,
educational and other measures to that end, and for organizations and
private persons to lend their fullest support to the achievement of this
objective,
Convinced that the building of a world society free from all forms
of religious intolerance is one of the fundamental objectives of the
United Nations,
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Solemnly affirms the necessity of adopting national and international measures to that end and in order to secure the universal and
effective recognition and observance of the principles set forth below,
Proclaims this declaration:
Article I
Discrimination between human beings on the grounds of religion
or belief is an offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a
denial of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as a
violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and as an obstacle to
friendly and peaceful relations among nations.
Article II
No States, institution, group or individual shall make any discrimination in matters of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
treatment of persons on the grounds of their religion or their belief.
Article III
1. Particular efforts shall be made to prevent discrimination
based on religion, especially in the fields of civil rights, access to
citizenship and the enjoyment of political rights, such as the right to
participate in elections, to hold public office, or in other ways to take
part in the government of his country.
2. Everyone has the right to effective remedial relief by the
competent national tribunals against any discrimination he may suffer
on the grounds of religion or belief, through acts violating fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
Article IV
Everyone has the right to adhere, or not to adhere, to a religion or
belief and to change in accordance with the dictates of his conscience-without being subjected to any pressure, inducement or undue influence likely to impair his freedom of choice or decision in this
matter.
Article V
Parents or legal guardians have the right to decide upon the religion or belief in which a child should be brought up. In the case of a
child who has been deprived of its parents, the best interests of the
child being the guiding principle, their expressed or presumed wish
shall be duly taken into account.
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Article VI
Everyone has the right to comply with what is prescribed by his
religion or belief and shall be free to worship, and profess, in public or
in private, without suffering any discrimination on account of his
religion or belief and specifically:
1. Every person and every group has the right to worship, either
alone or together with others, in public or in private, and to maintain
houses of worship in accordance with the prescription of their belief.
2. (i) Every individual has the right in association with others,
without any limitation based on the number of members, to form and
maintain religious communities and institutions.
(ii) Every religious community and institution has the right, in
association with similar religious communities and institutions, to form
territorial federations on a national, regional or local basis.
3. Everyone has the right to teach and to learn his religion or
belief, his sacred language and religious traditions, either in public or in
private. No one shall be compelled to receive instruction in a religion
or belief contrary to his convictions or, in the case of children, contrary to the wishes of their parents, or legal guardians. All education
shall be directed to promote understanding, tolerance and friendship
among all religions and beliefs.
4. Every religious group or community has the right to write, to
print and to publish religious books and texts and shall be permitted to
train the personnel required for the performance of its practices or
rites. No religious group or community shall be prevented from bringing teachers from abroad for this purpose. Every religious group or
community shall be enabled to have contacts with communities and
institutions belonging to the same religion abroad.
5. (i) Everyone has the right to observe the dietary practices
prescribed by his religion or belief. Any individual or any religious
community shall be permitted to acquire and produce all materials and
objects necessary for the observance of prescribed ritual or practices,
including dietary practices.
(ii) Where the State controls the means of production and
distribution, it shall help to provide the above-mentioned materials, or
the materials and means necessary for their production, to religious
communities of the religions concerned and to its members, and if
necessary allow them to be imported.
6. Everyone has the right to make pilgrimage to sites held in
veneration, whether inside or outside his country, and every State shall
grant freedom of access to these places.
7. Equal legal protection shall be accorded to all forms of worship, places of worship and institutions. Similar guarantees shall be
accorded to ritual objects, language of worship and sacred books.
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8. Due account shall be taken of the prescriptions of each religion or belief relating to holy days and days of rest, and all discrimination in this regard between persons of different religions or beliefs shall
be prohibited.
Article VII
Everyone shall have the right to have marriage rites performed in
accordance with the prescriptions of his religion or belief, and no one
shall be compelled to undergo a religious marriage ceremony not in
conformity with his convictions. Nothing in this Article shall, however, dispense anyone from the obligations to observe other requirements and formalities laid down by the law regarding marriage.
Article VIII
The prescriptions of the religion of a deceased person shall be
followed in all matters affecting burial customs, subject to the wishes,
if any, expressed by the deceased during his lifetime, or failing that
those of his family.
Article IX
Equal legal protection shall be afforded to all cemeteries or other
burial place and also to the funeral or memorial rites of all religions or
beliefs.
Article X
Religious communities shall have the right to receive the funds
necessary for the carrying out of their functions.
Article XI
No one shall be compelled to take an oath of a religious nature
contrary to his convictions.
Article XII
No State shall discriminate in the granting of subsidies, in taxation or in exemptions from taxation, between different religions or
beliefs or their adherents. However, public authorities shall not be
precluded from levying general taxes of from contributing funds for
the preservation of religious structures recognized as monuments of
historic or artistic value.
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Article XIII
1. The freedoms and rights set out in Articles I, II, III, IV, V
and XI shall not be subject to any restrictions.
2. The freedoms and rights set out elsewhere in this Declaration
shall be subject only to the restrictions prescribed by law solely for the
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the legitimate requirements of
morality, health, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society. Any restrictions which may be imposed shall be consistent
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and with the
rights and freedoms stated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. These freedoms and rights may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article XIV
1. All acts directed or intended to prevent or to restrict the
freedom of religion or cult shall be prohibited.
2. All incitements to hatred or acts of violence, whether by
individuals or organizations against any religious group of persons
belonging to a religious community, shall be considered an offense
against society and punishable by law and all propaganda designed to
foster or justify it, shall be condemned.
3. In order to put into effect the purposes and principles of the
present declaration, all States shall take immediate and positive measures, including legislative and other measures, to prosecute and/or
declare illegal organizations which promote and incite to religious
discrimination or incite to, or use violence for purposes of discrimination based on religion.
4. The United Nations, the specialized agencies, Member States
and non-governmental organizations shall do all in their power to
promote energetic action, through research, education, information,
and appropriate legislation with a view to hastening the elimination of
all forms of religious discrimination and intolerance.
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APPENDIX TWO
THE SUB-COMMISSION'S 1964 DRAFT DECLARATION AS
MODIFIED BY THE WORKING GROUP OF THE
FULL COMMISSION (1965)
Article I
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to adhere or not to adhere to
any religion or [to any religious or nonreligious] belief and to change
his religion or belief in accordance with the dictates of his conscience,
without being subjected to any coercion likely to impair his freedom of
choice or decision in the matter.
Article I
Discrimination between human beings on the ground of religion or
belief is an offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a
denial of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as a
violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and as an obstacle to
friendly and peaceful relations among nations.
Article III
1. No individual or group shall be subjected by any State, institution, group or individual on the ground of religion or belief to any
discrimination in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. Everyone has the right to effective remedial relief by the
competent national tribunals against any acts violating the rights set
forth in this Declaration or any acts of discrimination he may suffer on
the grounds of religion or belief [with respect to his fundamental rights
and freedoms as defined by the Constitution or by law].
Article IV
[I.] All States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination based on religion or belief, in the recognition,
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
all fields of civil, political, economic, social and cultural life. They
should enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit such
discrimination and take all appropriate measures to combat those prejudices which lead to'religious intolerance.
[2.] Particular efforts shall be made to prevent discrimination
based on religion or belief, especially in the fields of civil rights,
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[access to] citizenship and the enjoyment of political rights, such as the
right to participate in elections, to hold public office, or in other ways
to take part in the government of the country as well as in the field of
labour and employment.
Article V
[1.] Parents or legal guardians have the right to decide upon the
religion or belief in which a child should be brought up. In the case of a
child who has been deprived of its parents, their expressed [or
presumed] wish shall be duly taken into account, the best interests of
the child being the guiding principle. [If the child has reached a sufficient degree of understanding, his wish shall be taken into account].
[2.] The decision concerning the religion or belief in which a
child should be brought up must not be injurious to its interest or
health, and must not do him physical or moral harm. The child must be
guarded against practices which might inculcate in him any discrimination on account of religion or belief.
Article VI
Every person and every group or community has the right to
manifest their religion or belief in public or in private, without being
subjected to any discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief;
this right includes in particular:
(a) freedom to worship, to assemble and to establish and
maintain places of worship or assembly;
(b) freedom to teach, to disseminate [at home and abroad],
and to learn their religion or belief, and also its sacred languages or traditions;
(c) freedom to practise [sic] their religion or belief by establishing and maintaining charitable and educational institutions and by expressing the implications of religion or belief
in public life;
(d) freedom to observe the rites or customs of their religion
or belief.
APPENDIX THREE
DRAFT DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF INTOLERANCE AND OF DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON RELIGION OR BELIEF AS OF 1977
(1) Consideringthat one of the basic principles of the Charter of
the United Nations is that of the dignity and equality inherent in all
human beings, and that all States Members have pledged themselves to
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take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization to
promote and encourage universal respect for and observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion,
(2) Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenants on Human Rights proclaim the principles of non-discrimination and equality before the law and the right to
freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, including the right
to choose, manifest and change one's religion or belief,
(3) Considering that the disregard and infringement of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular of the right to freedom
of thought, conscience, religion or belief, have brought, directly or
indirectly, wars and great suffering to mankind, especially where they
serve as a means of foreign interference in the internal affairs of other
States and amount to kindling hatred between peoples and nations,
(4) Consideringthat religion or belief, for anyone who professes
either, is one of the fundamental elements in his conception of life and
that freedom of religion or belief should be fully respected and guaranteed,
(5) Considering that it is essential to promote understanding,
tolerance and respect in matters relating to freedom of religion and
belief and to ensure that the use of religion or belief for ends inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, other relevant instruments
of the United Nations and the purposes and principles of the present
Declaration is inadmissible,
(6) Convinced that freedom of religion and belief should also
contribute to the attainment of the goals of world peace, social justice
and friendship among peoples and to the elimination of ideologies or
practices of colonialism and racial discrimination,
(7) Noting with satisfaction the adoption of several and the
coming into force of some conventions, under the aegis of the United
Nations and of the specialized agencies, for the elimination of various
forms of discrimination,
(8) Concerned by manifestations of intolerance and by the existence of discrimination in matters of religion or belief still in evidence in
some areas of the world,
(9) Resolved to adopt all necessary measures for the speedy
elimination of such intolerance in all its forms and manifestations and
to prevent and combat discrimination on the ground of religion or
belief.
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